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567 
Before Interpretation 
Anya Bernstein† 
What is it that a judge interprets in a statutory interpretation case? This Ar-
ticle shows that the answer to this question is surprisingly complex. First, the text 
that a judge interprets is not simply given. Rather, judges must select texts to in-
terpret. Second, the background against which a judge views that text is also not 
given. Rather, judges situate the texts they interpret within unique, case-specific 
contexts that they construct from a diverse and unpredictable variety of factors. Se-
lecting and situating: these form the infrastructure of interpretation. Each requires 
judges to exercise creativity and choice. But opinions tend to present each instead 
as predictable and inevitable: not a creative and agonistic process, but a basis for 
assertions of determinate meaning. This Article illuminates how contestation and 
indeterminacy permeate legal interpretation even as judicial opinions seek to fix 
and finalize meaning. 
How do judges explain why they select the texts they do? How do they justify 
situating those texts in some factors but not others? How do they substantiate the 
way they characterize the factors they choose? Asking how opinions address their 
selecting and situating choices reveals how very unevenly they fulfill their basic 
obligation of giving reasons for their conclusions. Recognizing selection and situa-
tion opens up other lines of analytic and normative inquiry as well. For instance, it 
facilitates evaluations and comparisons that do not depend on judges’ expressed 
preferences or commitments. It also provides a robust way to analyze judges’ stat-
utory interpretations with respect to the normative questions that interest a par-
ticular commentator, instead of the normative values prepackaged by prominent 
theories like textualism and purposivism. 
Indeed, my approach highlights the limitations of those theories. Purposivism 
and textualism do not recognize that judges select text to interpret and drastically 
oversimplify how judges situate that text, leaving judges with little guidance about 
the very choices on which interpretation is based. This failure may not be too sur-
prising: these theories prescribe what interpreters ought to do, rather than explain 
what they, in fact, do. In contrast, my contribution helps us understand the prac-
tices through which legal actors justify interpretations, claim legitimacy, and set 
the terms of valid legal argument. 
 
 
 † Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo School of Law. JD, Yale Law School; PhD 
(Anthropology), The University of Chicago. I have benefited from the incisive commen-
tary of Todd Aagaard, Christine Bartholomew, Barton Beebe, Guyora Binder, Michael 
Boucai, Michael Coenen, Nicholas Day, David Engel, Richard Fallon, James Gardner, 
Jessica Greenberg, Jerry Mashaw, Hiroshi Motomura, Anthony O’Rourke, Nicholas 
Parrillo, Justin Richland, Cristina Rodríguez, Glen Staszewski, and Tico Taussig-Rubbo, 
as well as presentation participants at SUNY Buffalo School of Law, the Academia Sinica 
Institutum Iurisprudentiae, and the 2016 Law and Society Association conference. 
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I.  REFRAMING INTERPRETATION 
Interpretation requires an object: a text, an act, a concept, a 
something to be interpreted. An interpreter must pick out that 
object. How is that picking out accomplished? Studies of legal in-
terpretation rarely ask. Commentators argue about interpretive 
approaches, but tend to treat interpretation’s object as given. It 
is not. Legal interpreters select the objects they interpret. They 
are not entirely free in making such selections, of course. Like 
all communicators, they work within the constraints of their 
genre; and like all legal actors, they are subject to society’s un-
derstanding of what constitutes legitimate action. But they are 
not entirely bound, either. As communicators, they can creatively 
deploy and combine a variety of rhetorical moves. And as legal 
actors, they help shape the very parameters of legitimation to 
which they are subject. 
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An object of interpretation, moreover, needs a background to 
make its contours visible. Where does this background come 
from? Commentators agree that context matters for interpreting 
legal language, but rarely ask how that context comes to be. 
They sometimes talk as though interpreters were limited to a 
small set of preexisting contexts, each tied to some set of objects. 
Far from it. To situate the thing they interpret against a back-
ground that gives it shape and meaning, legal interpreters cob-
ble together diverse factors with unpredictable contours. They 
attribute to these factors particular attributes, and claim—
explicitly or not—that each is relevant to the interpretive project 
at hand. In this work also, they are both creative and con-
strained: as bound and as free as they are in the work of select-
ing the object of interpretation in the first place. 
In what follows, I elaborate on these claims. Focusing on 
statutory interpretation opinions written by Supreme Court jus-
tices,1 I show how judicial opinions select text to interpret and 
how they situate that text within contexts they create. In the 
genre of the judicial opinion, these creative moves are often pre-
sented as inevitable or obvious: expressions of indisputable fact 
rather than the claims and arguments that they really are. I 
suggest instead that these two conceptual moments—selecting 
and situating—are the constitutive forces of interpretation. The 
assertions and conclusions that opinions call interpretation are 
merely their precipitates. 
I take judicial opinions as ethnographic objects: artifacts 
that both reflect and affect cultural values and norms. In other 
words, I analyze not what judges say about themselves, but how 
 
 1 I choose this focus for several reasons. Supreme Court opinions set not just the 
doctrine but the tone for the judiciary, displaying modes of selecting and situating that 
can be taken up by other judicial interpreters. Their frequent dissents and concurrences 
help me highlight these practices’ creative nature. And the familiarity of many of the 
cases I discuss allows me to consider why selecting and situating have not previously 
been recognized as building blocks of interpretation. Of course, my focus is necessarily 
partial. The Supreme Court is a unique institution; lower courts may display their own 
selecting and situating patterns. Statutes are just one thing that legal actors interpret; 
selecting and situating may work differently with other legal objects. And courts are cer-
tainly not the only interpreters of statutes; administrative agencies, among others, play 
a central interpretive role in the modern state. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, 
Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory In-
terpretation, 57 Admin L Rev 501 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the 
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of 
Legislative History, 66 Chi Kent L Rev 321 (1990). Still, I hope that my discussion here 
contributes both to the literature on statutory interpretation and to an evolving under-
standing of legal interpretation more generally. 
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judicial opinions create their effects. To select what to interpret, 
opinions pick and choose among statutory phrases and concepts 
raised in litigation. Their selected texts open up some interpre-
tive arguments while closing off others. This process, moreover, 
happens independently of a justice’s preference for a particular 
theory of interpretation; selecting is, in a sense, conceptually 
prior.2 
To situate the texts they have selected, opinions draw on a 
wide range of sources, both legal and nonlegal, to create contexts 
unique to each case. Legal sources turn out to be sufficiently di-
verse to support divergent interpretations.3 And, despite the im-
plications of doctrine, nonlegal sources turn out to be no less de-
cisive.4 Moreover, when an opinion situates a text, it makes 
claims about relevance and reality. It posits that the factors it 
uses are the most useful to interpretation, and that its charac-
terization of those factors is accurate. These claims are central 
to an opinion’s reason-giving role, yet the classic opinions I dis-
cuss here vary dramatically in how they support their claims 
about both relevance and reality.5 
The prevailing theories of statutory interpretation, textual-
ism and purposivism, provide little analytic purchase on these 
fundamental interpretive practices.6 Neither recognizes that 
judges select texts to interpret. While they acknowledge that 
judges situate text in context, each specifies prefabricated con-
texts for judges to use—an offer the opinions examined here con-
sistently turn down. These theories prescribe how judges ought 
 
 2 This is why selecting different focal texts is one way that opinions that seem to 
follow the same interpretive approach can arrive at different interpretive conclusions. 
See Part II.A. 
 3 See Part III.A. 
 4 See Part III.B. 
 5 See Part III.C. 
 6 From the vast literature elucidating and debating these theories, I draw particu-
larly on, for example, Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Im-
plications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U Chi L Rev 1235 (2015); Robert A. 
Katzmann, Judging Statutes (Oxford 2014); Richard H. Fallon Jr, Three Symmetries be-
tween Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreduc-
ible Roles of Values and Judgment within Both, 99 Cornell L Rev 685 (2014); John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum L Rev 70 (2006); 
Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 Loyola LA L Rev 2027 (2005); 
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton 
1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed); William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 
(Harvard 1994); and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 
Mich L Rev 20 (1988). 
BERNSTEIN_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017  11:22 AM 
2017] Before Interpretation 571 
 
to interpret, rather than analyzing how they actually do so.7 The 
problem with textualism and purposivism, I suggest, is not just 
that most judges adopt a little of both. It is that these theories 
ignore the infrastructure of interpretation. This makes it espe-
cially unfortunate that so much scholarship focuses on these 
theories rather than on how opinions structure and support 
their interpretations. 
In contrast, recognizing selecting and situating as key con-
ceptual moments in statutory interpretation helps explain how 
opinions stake their claims. It also provides a firm, flexible basis 
for a range of normative evaluations not hemmed in by the pre-
determined stances of interpretive theories. Rather than worry-
ing about whether an opinion conforms to a predetermined set 
of prescriptive tenets, commentators can use my approach to 
evaluate the thoroughness of an opinion’s reason-giving, the 
propriety of its relative valuation of legal and nonlegal sources, 
the desirability of its image of the law, and much more. Directly 
recognizing selecting and situating allows for normative evalua-
tion of—and normative debate about—the underlying values 
that adjudication serves.8 
Finally, drawing on scholarship in linguistics, anthropology, 
and political theory, my approach illuminates how judicial opin-
ions exert effects on the world. Selecting constitutes a particular 
text as the focus of interpretation; situating constitutes particu-
lar factors as relevant to that interpretation. Presenting these 
things as predetermined, judicial opinions routinely give the im-
pression that their conclusions are inevitable or determinate, as 
though opinions could escape from the ongoing semiosis of the 
common-law system and of democratic practice itself. This false 
 
 7 See Part IV.A. See also William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 322 (1990) (“[E]ach theory 
rests upon and subserves important values that should be considered when interpreting 
statutes.”). 
 8 See Part IV.B. Professors Daryl J. Levinson and Mark Kelman have each shown 
how expanding or contracting a view along one axis of interpretation, such as time, can 
change a legal outcome in ways doctrine does not recognize. See Daryl J. Levinson, 
Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311, 1316–18, 1326–32 
(2002); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan 
L Rev 591, 600–16 (1981). Like Levinson and Kelman, I hope to “expos[e] the substantive 
issues and judgments buried beneath empty and anodyne doctrinal [and theoretical] rhet-
oric.” Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1314 n 2 (cited in note 8). And I, too, show how legal in-
terpretation depends on an interpreter’s frame. The frames I present, however, do not 
come preconstructed: there is no one axis—time, group, and so on—along which a frame 
becomes larger or smaller. Rather, I highlight the essential bricolage of interpretation. 
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sense of finality suggests that legal language forms a discourse 
apart: a separate sphere that is somehow spared the uncertainties 
and instabilities that characterize other forms of communication. 
Selecting and situating help us see the speech act at the 
heart of legal interpretation.9 Just as arguing over meaning ex-
presses “the impulse to keep the contest going,” attempts to fix 
meaning express the countervailing “impulse[ ] of political life 
. . . to be finally freed of the burdens of contest.”10 My analysis 
brings both impulses into view at the same time. And it suggests 
that it is precisely through the indeterminacy of meaning that 
people claim, contest, and set the conditions for legal legitimacy. 
II.  SELECTING: CHOOSING A FOCAL TEXT TO INTERPRET 
Judicial opinions often state that interpretation starts with 
the statutory text.11 But how do judges know what that text is? 
That is, how do they determine the proper object for their inter-
pretation? For the most part, legal analysis does not ask. It 
treats this process as unproblematic: a predictable precipitate of 
the disagreement that gave rise to the lawsuit in the first 
place.12 The subject of a case supposedly makes it obvious what 
 
 9 See Part IV.C. Utterances that constitute the conditions they refer to are known 
as creative utterances. Michael Silverstein, Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural 
Description, in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby, eds, Meaning in Anthropology 11, 33–
34 (New Mexico 1976) (distinguishing between utterances in which an “aspect of the 
speech situation [is] presupposed by the sign token,” such that one cannot understand a 
word without some shared knowledge about its situation of use, and a creative usage, 
which “make[s] explicit and overt the parameters of structure of the ongoing events” and 
brings some aspect “into sharp cognitive relief”). The most widely known kind of creative 
utterance is the performative or speech act. See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words 4–7 (Harvard 1962); John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Language 16–19 (Cambridge 1974). 
 10 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics 2, 14 (Cornell 1993). 
 11 See, for example, King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2489 (2015) (“We begin with the 
text of [the statutory provision].”); Milner v Department of the Navy, 562 US 562, 569 
(2011) (“Our consideration of [the statutory provision’s] scope starts with its text.”); 
Tapia v United States, 564 US 319, 326 (2011) (“Our consideration . . . starts with the 
text of [the statute].”); Muscarello v United States, 524 US 125, 127 (1998) (“We begin 
with the statute’s language.”); King v St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 US 215, 218 (1991) (“We 
start with the text of [the statute].”). 
 12 This lack of attention to the process by which a focal statutory text is selected 
contrasts with a more developed discussion around the related issue of the “level of gen-
erality” at which a legal principle or individual right should be stated. See Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1, 15–19 
(1959) (discussing levels of generality in constitutional law); Anthony O’Rourke, Sub-
stantive Due Process for Noncitizens: Lessons from Obergefell, 114 Mich L Rev First Im-
pressions 9, 15–16 (2015) (discussing level-of-generality issues in substantive due pro-
cess). The level of generality question asks: “[A]t what level of generality should the Court 
BERNSTEIN_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017  11:22 AM 
2017] Before Interpretation 573 
 
it is judges should interpret. In any event, it is litigants, not 
judges, who put statutory terms at issue. Commentary and doc-
trine tend to assume that judges take the case as they find it, in-
terpreting the terms they are presented with. 
This easy assumption turns out to be wrong. As this Part 
shows, considerable judicial labor can go into determining the 
object of statutory interpretation. Sometimes acknowledged, 
sometimes obscured, this labor involves choices about what text 
to interpret. At a minimum, judges choose whether to focus on 
statutory text at all; which swatch of text to focus on; which part 
of a swatch to emphasize; and how to parse a part. Text selec-
tion specifies the focal text whose meaning is to be determined. 
It is thus the condition of possibility for interpretation. 
Text selection also has profound implications for the ensu-
ing interpretative process. Legal texts come heavily populated 
with meanings: they are always intertextually interacting with 
discursive trajectories that imbue them with implications and 
place them within worlds of reference.13 Because of this inter-
textual interplay, selecting a focal text opens up some argu-
ments and closes off others; makes some conclusions obvious 
and others absurd; and helps determine what might be rele-
vant to interpretation. Selecting the focal text is the axis on 
which interpretation turns. 
 
describe the right previously protected and the right currently claimed? The more ab-
stractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the 
claimed right will fall within its protection.” Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, 
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U Chi L Rev 1057, 1058 (1990). Ana-
lyzing how opinions select focal text involves something related, but not identical. The 
level of generality question assumes a concentric regime in which every successive level 
of abstraction encompasses its less general articulation of rights. In selecting text, how-
ever, judges do not need to move along a single scale of abstraction but can find their fo-
cal text in a variety of different places. Determining the appropriate level of generality is 
like determining how wide to open the aperture; selecting text is more like deciding 
where to point the camera. 
 13 See M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays 278 (Texas 1981) 
(Michael Holquist, ed) (Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans). Mikhail M. Bakhtin 
wrote that, although literary theory preferred to treat written texts in isolation, “[f]or the 
writer,” any “object reveals first of all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its 
names, definitions and value judgments,” a “multitude of routes, roads and paths that 
have been laid down in the object by social consciousness” and the “unfolding of social 
heteroglossia surrounding the object,” that is, the texts that have gone before and that 
coexist with the writer. Id. This “dialogic orientation,” moreover, “is a phenomenon that 
is, of course, a property of any discourse.” Id at 279. 
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A. How Opinions Select Focal Texts 
The way judges select their focal texts usually goes 
unacknowledged. Yet it is sometimes in plain view and even 
forms an explicit subject of debate. 
1. Selecting statutory phrases. 
In the statutory interpretation classic Babbitt v Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,14 for instance, the 
majority interpreted the word “harm,” while the dissent instead 
focused on the word “take.”15 The Endangered Species Act of 
197316 made it “unlawful for any person” to “take any” endan-
gered wildlife.17 The Act defined “take” as “to harass, harm, pur-
sue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to at-
tempt to engage in any such conduct.”18 Fish and Wildlife 
Service regulations implementing the statute interpreted the 
term harm in the statute’s definition of take as “an act which ac-
tually kills or injures wildlife,” including through “significant 
habitat modification or degradation.”19 Commercial users of for-
ests challenged this regulation, arguing that the prohibition 
should be “limited . . . to direct applications of force against pro-
tected species” with intent to injure them, and should not extend 
to habitat modifications that affected species indirectly.20 
The majority opinion, written by Justice John Paul Stevens 
for six justices, evaluated this argument by asking whether the 
statutory term harm must be limited to direct force. The major-
ity concluded that it did not have to be. The opinion noted that 
dictionary definitions do not limit harm to direct force,21 and 
that the statute’s “broad purpose” and Supreme Court precedent 
suggested that direct force was not required for the prohibition 
to kick in.22 Further, imputing an intent requirement to harm 
 
 14 515 US 687 (1995). Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. O’Connor also wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Antonin 
Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence 
Thomas. Id at 688. 
 15 Id at 694–708 (Stevens); id at 717–18 (Scalia dissenting). 
 16 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq. 
 17 Sweet Home, 515 US at 690–91, quoting 16 USC § 1538(a)(1). 
 18 Sweet Home, 515 US at 691, quoting 16 USC § 1532(19) (emphasis added). 
 19 Sweet Home, 515 US at 691, quoting 50 CFR § 17.3. 
 20 Sweet Home, 515 US at 692–93, 696–97. 
 21 Id at 697–98. 
 22 Id at 698–700. 
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would make it overlap with other terms in the definition, ren-
dering it superfluous.23 
In contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion, for 
three justices, identified the text at issue not as harm but as 
take: “The term ‘harm’ in [the statutory definition] has no legal 
force of its own . . . , for the only operative term in the statute is 
to ‘take.’”24 For instance, “[a]n indictment or civil complaint that 
charged the defendant with ‘harming’ an animal protected under 
the Act would be dismissed as defective,” because it is taking that 
is prohibited.25 The dissent took take as the thing to interpret. 
Harm versus take: What difference does it make? In Sweet 
Home, the difference between reversing and affirming. The two 
sides’ divergent focal texts justified divergent interpretations. 
For the dissent, take came prepopulated with centuries of mean-
ing. A “term [ ] as old as the law itself,” take was “a term of art 
deeply embedded in the statutory and common law concerning 
wildlife.”26 This history imbued it with an enduring definition: 
“when applied to wild animals, [to take] means to reduce those 
animals, by killing or capturing, to human control.”27 Scalia rec-
ognized that the statute provided its own definition of the term: 
“If ‘take’ were not elsewhere defined in the Act, none could dis-
pute what it means.”28 But take’s historical pedigree took defini-
tional primacy. On the dissent’s approach, the Court’s job was to 
interpret the common-law term take as it appeared in the stat-
ute. Being defined in the statute, in other words, could not re-
move its common-law signification. Harm, on this reading, could 
not enlarge or alter the meaning of take; rather, harm itself had 
to be read in light of the common-law meaning of take.29 
 
 23 Id at 697–98. 
 24 Sweet Home, 515 US at 717 (Scalia dissenting). 
 25 Id (Scalia dissenting). 
 26 Id at 717–18 (Scalia dissenting). 
 27 Id at 717 (Scalia dissenting). 
 28 Sweet Home, 515 US at 717 (Scalia dissenting). 
 29 Professor Karin P. Sheldon points out that the dissent, while conceding that 
“take” was “elsewhere defined in the Act,” id (Scalia dissenting), effectively ignored this 
fact. Karin P. Sheldon, “It’s Not My Job to Care”: Understanding Justice Scalia’s Method 
of Statutory Interpretation through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 BC Envir Aff L Rev 
487, 530 (1997) (“‘Harm’ is subordinate to and limited by the historic and common mean-
ing of ‘take,’ Justice Scalia concluded, because it has no legal force of its own.”). See also 
Sweet Home, 515 US at 697 n 10 (Stevens) (“Congress explicitly defined the operative 
term ‘take’ in the ESA, . . . thereby obviating the need for us to probe its meaning.”). On 
this criticism, rather than taking Congress’s word, the dissent held Congress to a meaning 
“as old as the law itself.” Sweet Home, 515 US at 717 (Scalia dissenting). See also Robin 
Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations 
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Focusing on harm, the majority was not so constrained. It 
drew, for instance, on a 1982 statutory amendment authorizing 
the agency to issue a permit for an otherwise-prohibited taking 
“if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, . . . an 
otherwise lawful activity.”30 To the majority, this authorization 
indicated that, for the purposes of the Endangered Species Act, 
taking need not always be purposeful: there would be no need to 
specially permit “incidental” taking if it were not prohibited to 
begin with. Thus, “Congress understood [the original provision] 
to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings.”31 For the ma-
jority, the statutory definition, with its inclusion of harm, modi-
fied the common-law implications of take. Even if it had no oper-
ative “legal force of its own,”32 harm was an operative definition: 
understanding what take meant in the statute required inter-
preting harm. So harm formed the proper focus for interpreta-
tion, and its range of meanings informed the meaning of take, 
which the majority concluded spanned “indirect as well as delib-
erate takings.”33 For the dissent, in contrast, there was no such 
thing as “indirect[ ]” takings.34 The common law lacked a concept 
of incidental taking; including harm in the statutory definition 
could not change that. 
Note how selecting the focal text in Sweet Home largely de-
termined the path that interpretation would take. Take’s history 
as a common-law term of art emphasized the willful, individual-
ized aspects of human relations to wildlife based on the proto-
types of hunting and trapping. Harm’s diffuse range of meanings 
better supported an interpretation independent of human will or 
intent. After all, we often speak of someone being harmed acci-
dentally, or doing harm without meaning to—indeed, the con-
cept of negligence is based on this possibility. Each opinion con-
sidered the relation between the statute’s prohibition on taking 
and its definition of that term. But the way each opinion figured 
that relationship—with harm taking precedence in one and take 
 
and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 Tulane L Rev 
955, 1021 (2005) (“[T]he import of Justice Scalia’s argument is that Congress cannot rid 
itself of the meaning and limitations of a well-established term of art, no matter how 
Congress defines the term in the statute, because no definition can escape the historical 
baggage that accompanies the operative term.”). 
 30 Sweet Home, 515 US at 691, quoting 16 USC § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 31 Sweet Home, 515 US at 700. 
 32 Id at 717 (Scalia dissenting). 
 33 Id at 700. 
 34 Id at 718 (Scalia dissenting). 
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taking precedence in the other—predicted the interpretation it 
would reach. 
I do not mean to suggest that these connections are neces-
sary or inevitable. A judge selecting take as the focal text could 
surely still reason her way to an interpretation that did not re-
quire intentional injury. Nonetheless, particular terms exist 
within webs of historical, social, and legal relationships. These 
intertextual connections can link terms to particular spheres of 
meaning and orientations to the world.35 Such connections do not 
necessarily define a term conclusively, but they can make some 
ways of characterizing it easier, more natural, than others. 
Through such intertextual resonance, a text can seem to suggest 
a path for its own interpretation. This is why selecting the focal 
text of interpretation is so important: because legal texts never 
exist in isolation but sit within larger spheres of meaning, un-
derstanding, and normative commitment, each option opens up 
certain arguments while making others more difficult. 
Judicial opinions rarely acknowledge that they select focal 
text, nor do they usually discuss the reasoning behind their se-
lection. It is likely that, at some level, underlying worldviews 
and normative commitments guide text selection. Note, though, 
that neither selecting focal text nor exploring the commitments 
that motivate that selection is comfortably captured by the two 
most prominent approaches used to discuss statutory interpre-
tation: textualism and purposivism.36 A textualist deciding Sweet 
 
 35 “[I]ntertextual relationships between a particular text and prior discourse (real 
or imagined) play a crucial role in shaping form, function, discourse structure, and 
meaning; . . . and in building competing perspectives on what is taking place.” Charles L. 
Briggs and Richard Bauman, Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power, 2 J Linguistic An-
thropology 131, 147 (1992). Intertextual relations set up audience expectations: “[a]s 
soon as we hear a generic framing device, such as ‘once upon a time,’ we unleash a set of 
expectations regarding narrative form and content.” Id. But they also “pertain[ ] crucially 
to negotiations of identity and power—by invoking a particular genre, producers of dis-
course assert (tacitly or explicitly) that they possess the authority needed to decontextu-
alize discourse that bears these historical and social connections and to recontextualize it 
in the current discursive setting.” Id at 148. When old texts carry great weight, for in-
stance, “creating links with traditional genres is often the most powerful strategy for 
creating textual authority,” id, as the Sweet Home dissent does in its invocation of the 
common law. “We can say, thus, that [ ] intertextuality affords great power for naturaliz-
ing both texts and the cultural reality that they represent.” Id. 
 36 For examples of articles that discuss textualism and purposivism but ignore the 
issue of selecting text, see Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 21–22 (cited in note 6) (noting 
that “[t]raditional debates about statutory interpretation have usually been intramu-
ral disputes” between the theories of “textualism (or plain meaning) and intentional-
ism (or purpose analysis)”); Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1237 (cited in note 6) (stating 
that “[t]he law reviews and judicial opinions both teem with debates about theories of 
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Home might reasonably focus on take, the operative legal term 
that the statutory definition defines. But she might also focus on 
harm, the operative definition that Congress enacted in the 
statute. A purposivist might focus on harm as the term that re-
veals what Congress wanted the taking restriction to accom-
plish; but she might also focus on take as expressing Congress’s 
overarching goals for the restriction. Each choice could be com-
patible with each theory. Neither theory’s tenets motivate, or 
explain, the selection through which each side justifies its inter-
pretive conclusions. 
2. Selecting parts of statutory phrases. 
Selecting entirely different sections of the statute—such as 
take as opposed to harm—is not the only way judges choose dif-
ferent focal texts. Opinions may emphasize different parts of the 
same phrase in ways that make certain interpretations more or 
less natural. King v Burwell,37 for instance, asked whether the 
Affordable Care Act38 made federal tax credits available only to 
those who purchased health insurance on a state-run market, or 
also to those who used a federally run market.39 The statute re-
quired states to organize such markets, or “Exchange[s],” but also 
provided that the federal government would organize markets 
for states that did not.40 The statute provided for tax credits 
for eligible individuals who purchased health insurance on “an 
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [codified at 42 USC 
§ 18031].”41 Both the majority and dissenting opinions at the 
Supreme Court took this statutory phrase as their object of in-
terpretation. But the dissent focused on the phrase established 
by the State, while the majority focused on Exchange . . . under 
section 1311. 
 
legal interpretation,” including textualism and purposivism); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textu-
alism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 BU L Rev 1023, 1024 (1998) (“The 
current debate about statutory interpretation is often characterized as a battle between 
textualists and intentionalists.”). 
 37 135 S Ct 2480 (2015). Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan. 
Scalia dissented, joined by Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito. Id at 2484. 
 38 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 39 King, 135 S Ct at 2485. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id at 2487 (emphasis omitted). 
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Written for a six-justice majority, Chief Justice John Roberts’s 
opinion presented the statute as dealing with a single type of 
thing—“an Exchange”—rather than with a federal Exchange 
and a state Exchange. “[T]he Act requires the creation of an ‘Ex-
change’ in each State” and “provides that the Federal Govern-
ment will establish the Exchange if the State does not.”42 Thus, 
the statute established one kind of marketplace—an Exchange—
that could be run by different bodies. “This case is about whether 
the Act’s interlocking reforms apply equally in each State no 
matter who establishes the State’s Exchange.”43 Whether run by 
the state or the federal government, an insurance marketplace 
is “the Exchange” in a given state: “the State’s Exchange.”44 
The background understanding that the statute contem-
plated only one kind of marketplace—an Exchange—allowed the 
majority opinion to weave statutory provisions together to con-
clude that a federally run Exchange was “an Exchange estab-
lished by the State under section 1311.”45 Section 1311 required 
each state to form an Exchange.46 If a state failed to do so, how-
ever, § 1321(c)(1) of the Act (codified at 42 USC § 18041(c)(1)) 
required the federal agency to “establish and operate such Ex-
change within the State.’’47 The use of the term such Exchange, 
the majority explained, indicated that the federally operated Ex-
change was the same thing as a state-operated Exchange. It was 
an Exchange established under § 1311, by way of § 1321’s re-
quirement that the federal government establish such Exchange 
under certain circumstances. 
On this reading, the notion of Exchange was a single statu-
tory creation. Established by the State was not a stand-alone 
phrase but one modified by the words that followed it: under sec-
tion 1311. The phrase under section 1311, in turn, could be given 
meaning only by looking to § 1311 itself. That section created 
the concept of an Exchange and provided one way of establishing 
one; that way of establishing an Exchange was supplemented by 
§ 1321, to which § 1311 was therefore tied.48 The majority, in 
other words, focused on those portions of the statutory phrase 
most closely tied to the statute: concepts and processes the 
 
 42 Id at 2485 (emphasis added). 
 43 King, 135 S Ct at 2485 (emphasis added). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id at 2487 (emphasis omitted). 
 46 Id at 2489. 
 47 King, 135 S Ct at 2489. 
 48 See id at 2491. 
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statute itself created. Treating an Exchange as one type of thing 
that came in different flavors—all connected through statutory 
provisions—made it easier to argue that all Exchanges were 
subject to the same strictures, irrespective of which institution 
ran them. 
Scalia’s dissent, for three justices, selected a different part 
of the same phrase: established by the State. It mocked as “ab-
surd” the majority’s conclusion that “when the [statute] says 
‘Exchange established by the State’ it means ‘Exchange estab-
lished by the State or the Federal Government.’”49 The im-
portant thing, on this approach, was neither the nature of an 
Exchange nor the function of § 1311. It was the meaning of es-
tablished by the State. And that, the dissent explained, was 
quite obvious: “Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange 
that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’”50 
Focusing on established by the State made it easier to argue that 
different kinds of objects, perhaps subject to different strictures, 
were at issue. 
Moreover, because established by the State is a phrase that 
could be found in everyday speech, it was easier for the dissent 
to imply that the answer to the interpretive question was obvi-
ous, not requiring a complex analysis of how parts of the statute 
worked together.51 In other words, the availability of a simple 
and straightforward reading of established by the State allowed 
the dissent to suggest that the entire statutory phrase should be 
simple and straightforward. In contrast, the majority’s focus on 
terms whose meanings depended on the statute itself suggested 
that something other than everyday usage might be at play. 
The King dissent thus made a textualist argument for the 
way it interpreted established by the State. But was there a tex-
tualist argument for selecting that part of the phrase in the first 
place? In Sweet Home, a textualist could reasonably select not the 
definitional term harm but the verb it defined, take. Similarly, in 
 
 49 Id at 2496 (Scalia dissenting). Another way of putting it is that the dissent re-
jected the notion—suggested by the majority—that Exchange is a legal term of art whose 
definition derives exclusively from the statute. See Part III.B. 
 50 King, 135 S Ct at 2497 (Scalia dissenting). 
 51 See, for example, id at 2496 (Scalia dissenting) (calling the majority’s interpreta-
tion “quite absurd”); id at 2496–97 (Scalia dissenting) (“You would think the answer 
would be obvious—so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to 
hear a case about it. . . . [A]n Exchange established by the Secretary is not an Exchange 
established by the State.”); id at 2497 (Scalia dissenting) (“It is hard to come up with a 
clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by 
the State.’”). See also Part III.B (discussing invocations of ordinary language usage). 
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King, a textualist might reasonably select not the modifying 
phrase established by the State but the noun that it modified, 
Exchange.52 Textualist tenets do not preclude selecting estab-
lished by the State; but they do not necessitate it, either. Pur-
posivism might have more predictive power here: a background 
understanding of the statute’s overarching goals and the way 
the tax credit provision fit into them could help motivate a fo-
cus on Exchange and section 1311. But the majority’s selection 
is also compatible with textualism: it takes into account an in-
terlocking set of statutory provisions, makes sense of language 
that treats all Exchanges as the same sort of thing, and coheres 
this phrase with enacted statutory text specifying how the sys-
tem should function. 
Textualism and purposivism, then, may describe the atti-
tudes or self-reported commitments of the justices who wrote or 
voted for the opinions. But they are at best blunt instruments 
for analyzing how and why the opinions select their focal texts. 
Worse yet, the theories’ analytic weaknesses may bolster the 
ability of each opinion to frame its selection as obvious and in-
disputable, rather than explaining it through underlying beliefs 
or commitments that others could evaluate. 
3. Parsing selected phrases. 
In Sweet Home, the two opinions selected separate focal 
texts: harm in the definitions section, and take in the statutory 
provision. In King, the two opinions selected different portions of 
the same phrase: Exchange . . . under section 1311 as opposed to 
established by the State.53 But judges can also select the same 
words and still arrive at different interpretations by parsing their 
selected text in different ways. For instance, in Smith v United 
States,54 a statute imposed a mandatory minimum prison sen-
tence on a person who “use[s] [ ] a firearm during and in relation 
 
 52 Focusing on Exchange would make an ordinary language analysis more elusive, 
because Exchange in the sense of health insurance marketplace is not a term that existed 
in ordinary language before the Affordable Care Act created it. But that would not be a 
reason to reject focusing on it under the principles of textualism. 
 53 These are, of course, not absolute distinctions: one could characterize the King 
opinions as focusing on different texts as well. The strategies I discuss here are often 
fuzzy-bordered and overlapping. My point is not to create a strict taxonomy but to point 
out a range of moves that opinions make and to show that they are systemically related. 
 54 508 US 223 (1993). O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, 
Justice Byron White, Justice Harry Blackmun, Kennedy, and Thomas. Blackmun also 
wrote a concurring opinion. Scalia dissented, joined by Stevens and Souter. Id at 224. 
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to a drug trafficking crime.”55 The defendant, John Smith, had 
offered to give someone a gun in exchange for two ounces of co-
caine.56 Did that constitute “use of a firearm”? 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor for six justices, asked whether what Smith did with 
his firearm constituted a use of it. O’Connor reasoned that to use 
something means simply to “employ” it for some purpose.57 On 
this reading, one can just as easily “use” a gun to trade for drugs 
as “use” money to do so. “Surely petitioner’s treatment of his 
[firearm] can be described as ‘use’ within the everyday meaning 
of that term.”58 Focusing on the word use, the majority thus 
parsed the statutory phrase to separate out the verb from its ob-
ject. The verb use, O’Connor implied, meant the same thing 
wherever it appeared. The fact that it appeared here in connec-
tion with a firearm did not alter or delimit its meaning. 
This majority opinion took what I call an additive approach 
to the statutory phrase. An additive approach treats each word 
as retaining its full range of meaning irrespective of the other 
words it co-occurs with. It interprets a phrase by adding to-
gether the independent meanings of its constituent words, as 
O’Connor did here, putting together the full range of meanings 
for use with that for firearm. 
Writing for three justices, Scalia dissented. He did not claim 
that the majority’s interpretation of use was wrong. Rather, he 
argued that the majority was interpreting the wrong term. The 
term at issue was not use, as applied to anything from money to 
firearms to tobacco. Instead, the proper object of interpretation 
was “the phrase ‘use[ ] a firearm.’”59 While use was an “elastic” 
word with a wide “range” of meanings,60 use a firearm was con-
siderably narrower: “to speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to speak of 
using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.”61 On this 
 
 55 Id at 225, quoting 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets 
omitted). See also Solan, 38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2033–36 (cited in note 6) (analyzing the 
debate in Smith). 
 56 Smith, 508 US at 225–26. 
 57 Id at 228–29, quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2806 (Merriam 2d 
ed 1950). 
 58 Smith, 508 US at 228. 
 59 Id at 243 (Scalia dissenting). 
 60 Id at 241–42 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 
at 2806 (cited in note 57) (arguing that the term “use” is “elastic” insofar as its “mean-
ings range all the way from ‘to partake of’ (as in ‘he uses tobacco’) to ‘to be wont or accus-
tomed’ (as in ‘he used to smoke tobacco’)”). 
 61 Smith, 508 US at 242 (Scalia dissenting). 
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approach, use did not have the same meaning wherever it ap-
peared. The things it appeared with could indicate its proper 
range of meaning. Although one can use a cane as a decoration, 
Scalia analogized, “[w]hen someone asks, ‘Do you use a cane?,’ 
he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s silver-
handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know 
whether you walk with a cane.”62 
In contrast to the majority’s additive approach, the dissent 
here took what I call a consolidating one. It treated the words as 
an integral whole—a set phrase or an idiom—and not a collection 
of words to be put together.63 On this view, a phrase can mean 
something less, more, or other than the sum of its parts. Ap-
proaching the statutory text in a consolidating way, as an idiom, 
enabled the dissent to argue that use a firearm should be inter-
preted to mean what that idiom normally means: to actualize 
some dangers or characteristics particular to a firearm, such as 
shooting or threatening to shoot someone. The majority’s choice 
of an additive approach, in turn, enabled its conclusion that any 
kind of use at all would satisfy the standard. By choosing to see 
the same statutory text as two different types of expression, the 
opinions arrived, quite naturally, at opposing conclusions.64 
Note that both opinions in Smith fit comfortably within the 
tenets of textualism, each sticking closely to the focal text and 
situating it in examples drawn from ordinary speech and dic-
tionary definitions.65 Yet sharing fundamental interpretive 
 
 62 Id (Scalia dissenting). 
 63 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 
Mich L Rev First Impressions 22, 24 (2008) (“The notion that phrases acquire meanings 
that are not reducible to the meanings of the constituent words is familiar to any compe-
tent speaker of a natural language. . . . We sometimes call such phrases ‘idioms.’”). 
 64 Professor Samuel L. Bray has explored a related phenomenon: hendiadys, a rhe-
torical trope “in which two terms separated by a conjunction work together as a single 
complex expression.” Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: 
Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 Va L Rev 687, 688 (2016). In the terms I introduce 
here, hendiadys is one version of a consolidating reading, as opposed to an additive one 
that is “read like a telegram—a word said, then ‘Stop,’ then another word, then another 
‘Stop.’” Id at 763. Bray argued for approaching his two focal phrases in a consolidating, 
or hendiadic, way, as a matter of original understanding. Id at 694. Bray may be right 
about the original understanding of these two phrases. But I believe that both hendiadic 
figures and other phrases susceptible to idiomatic reading are often characterized by a 
fundamental indeterminacy: often there will be no clearly correct, or incorrect, option. 
Rather, judges exercise judgment—often unacknowledged—to make such decisions. 
 65 On textualism, see Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 6) (argu-
ing that a judicial interpreter of an unclear statutory term should discern “the intent that 
a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder 
of the corpus juris”); Solan, 38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2029–30 (cited in note 6) (explaining 
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commitments did not prevent them from reaching opposite con-
clusions. From the vantage point of textualism as well as pur-
posivism, the divergence of opinions in Smith is quite mysteri-
ous. That is because neither theory recognizes the crucial fact 
that allows for Smith’s opposing opinions: judges select focal 
texts to interpret. Still less can these theories illuminate the pat-
terns that structure selection or the creativity that suffuses it. 
4. Selecting concepts raised by the litigation. 
The examples so far show how opinions can engage in the 
process of selecting—and thereby foreshadow different interpre-
tive conclusions—by choosing different focal texts; emphasizing 
different portions of a focal text; and parsing focal text differ-
ently. Other times, judges can instead select an issue, concept, 
or subject matter that lies outside the statutory text. Food and 
Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,66 
which asked whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
had the authority to regulate tobacco products,67 exemplifies this 
approach. 
Under the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act68 
(FDCA), the FDA regulated “articles . . . intended to affect the 
 
that, for evidence about the meanings of unclear terms, textualists eschew pronounce-
ments by those who wrote and voted on the terms and consider instead what those terms 
mean to idiomatic speakers of American English); Manning, 106 Colum L Rev at 91 (cited 
in note 6) (noting that “[t]extualists give primacy to the semantic context” of statutory 
terms) (emphasis omitted). Neither opinion in Smith took a purposivist stance: neither 
based its conclusions on claims about what the legislature that enacted the statute was 
trying to achieve, nor did either draw on sources surrounding the statute’s enactment. 
On seeking statutory purpose and using legislative history, see Katzmann, Judging 
Statutes at 31 (cited in note 6) (arguing that judges’ “fundamental task . . . is to deter-
mine what Congress was trying to do,” which requires considering “the statute’s pur-
pose(s) as enacted by legislators,” which can be gleaned in part from “legislative materi-
als that reliably contribute to understanding the statute’s meaning”); Abner J. Mikva, A 
Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 Duke L J 380, 386 (“If judges are to make con-
gressional primacy meaningful, they cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools which 
members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of 
the words used in the statute.”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory In-
terpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L J 70, 91, 94–95 (2012) (explain-
ing what legislative history is and how it is produced); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary 
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 BC L Rev 1613, 
1615 (2014) (arguing that “Congress has the functional equivalent of intent”). 
 66 529 US 120 (2000). O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Breyer dissented, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 
Id at 123. 
 67 Id at 125–26. 
 68 52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq. 
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structure or any function of the body.”69 Thus, the agency had ju-
risdiction over articles that both affected the structure and func-
tion of the body and were marketed with the intent to do so.70 
From its inception, the FDA had declined to regulate tobacco, at 
least in part because of its inability to show both of these fac-
tors.71 But in 1996, the agency asserted such jurisdiction, citing 
evidence confirming both that “cigarettes . . . are ‘drug delivery 
devices’” for nicotine, and that their effects on the structure and 
functions of the body were “‘intended’ under the FDCA because 
they ‘are so widely known and foreseeable that [they] may be 
deemed to have been intended by the manufacturers.’”72 Tobacco 
manufacturers sued. 
Writing for a five-justice majority, O’Connor’s opinion first 
discussed the “essential purpose” of “the FDCA as a whole,” 
which it described as “ensur[ing] that any product regulated by 
the FDA is ‘safe’ and ‘effective’ for its intended use.”73 This over-
arching purpose “generally requires the FDA to prevent the 
marketing of any . . . device where the ‘potential for inflicting 
death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of thera-
peutic benefit.’”74 The FDA, however, had determined that “to-
bacco products [we]re unsafe.”75 Thus, the majority concluded, 
the FDA could exercise jurisdiction over tobacco products in a 
 
 69 FDCA § 201(g)(3), 52 Stat at 1041, codified as amended at 21 USC § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 70 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 170–72 (Breyer dissenting) (discussing congres-
sional hearings at which tobacco manufacturers denied that nicotine is addictive). 
 71 See id at 125; Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The 
Norm of Agency Continuity, in William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth 
Garrett, eds, Statutory Interpretation Stories 335, 346 (Foundation Press 2011) (“The 
newfound evidence of [tobacco companies’] nicotine manipulation [to increase cigarettes’ 
nicotine content], and therefore ‘intent,’ was the trigger to bring nicotine within the 
FDCA’s ambit. . . . Knowledge of that factual predicate did not exist until after 1992.”). 
 72 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 127 (brackets in original). See also Food and 
Drug Administration, Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes 
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed Reg 44396, 44418 
(1996), amending various sections of CFR Title 21. Additionally, the FDA had amassed 
considerable evidence that tobacco manufacturers sold nicotine products with the in-
tent to affect human bodies, despite their public claims to the contrary. See Brown & 
Williamson, 529 US at 172–73 (Breyer dissenting). See also generally Ruger, The Story 
of FDA v. Brown & Williamson (cited in note 71). 
 73 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 133, citing 21 USC § 393(b)(2) (Supp III 1994). 
The current version of this provision reads: “The Administration shall . . . protect the 
public health by ensuring that . . . there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of devices intended for human use.” 21 USC § 393(b) (paragraph breaks omitted). 
 74 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 134, quoting United States v Rutherford, 442 US 
544, 556 (1979). 
 75 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 134, quoting 61 Fed Reg at 44412 (cited in 
note 72). 
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way that comported with the statute’s essential purpose only by 
banning them entirely.76 This it could not do, however, because 
several other statutes had made it clear that Congress did not 
wish to prohibit tobacco products entirely.77 It would be incon-
gruous, the majority decided, for Congress both to regulate to-
bacco directly and to give the FDA jurisdiction over it.78 
What is the focal text that the Brown & Williamson majority 
interpreted? It is a bit difficult to say. The bulk of the opinion—
roughly eighteen pages—discussed statutes enacted “since 
1965,” that is, decades after the FDCA.79 The opinion also spent 
roughly eight pages discussing the course of conduct that other 
provisions of the FDCA would impose on the FDA, but these 
provisions become relevant only in light of the congressional in-
tent imputed from subsequently enacted statutes.80 To the ex-
tent that the FDCA’s text played a role in the majority’s inter-
pretation, the majority did not focus on the provision of the 
FDCA that determined the agency’s scope of authority: “arti-
cles . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.” In fact, the majority specifically declined to interpret 
that jurisdiction-granting provision with respect to tobacco.81 
Instead, the opinion viewed other provisions in light of later 
statutes to derive the FDCA’s “essential purpose.”82 
The import of subsequently enacted statutes for under-
standing the FDCA’s provisions lies not in some particular 
statutory text, but in the concept of tobacco. The question the 
majority set out to answer, in other words, was not what a partic-
ular statutory phrase or provision meant, but whether Congress 
intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco. Selecting this focus 
 
 76 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 143 (“[I]f tobacco products were within the FDA’s 
jurisdiction, the Act would require the FDA to remove them from the market entirely.”). 
 77 Id at 137 (“Congress, however, has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products 
from the market.”). 
 78 Id at 126 (concluding that the FDA’s assertion of “authority is inconsistent with 
the intent that Congress has expressed in the FDCA’s overall regulatory scheme and in 
the tobacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA”). 
 79 See id at 137–39, 143–59. 
 80 See Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 133–37, 139–43. 
 81 See id at 131–32: 
We need not resolve this question [of whether the FDA may impute an intent 
to affect bodily structure or function], however, because assuming, arguendo, 
that a product can be “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body” absent claims of therapeutic or medical benefit, the FDA’s claim to juris-
diction contravenes the clear intent of Congress. 
 82 Id at 133. 
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allowed the majority to resist interpreting the provision that de-
fined the FDA’s jurisdiction and focus instead on later-enacted 
statutes. The Brown & Williamson majority’s approach es-
chews a focus on statutory text in favor of an extrastatutory 
one: a focal object or concept suggested by the subject of the lit-
igation, in light of which the statute’s general implications can 
be interpreted. 
The dissent disputed the inferences that the majority drew 
from both the FDCA and subsequent laws.83 But it first asserted 
that looking to subsequent laws was incorrect: the “language 
and purpose” of the statute were “sufficient to establish that the 
FDA ha[d] authority to regulate tobacco.”84 Justice Stephen 
Breyer first noted that the majority “nowhere denie[d]” that “to-
bacco products . . . fall within the scope of th[e] statutory defini-
tion” of the FDA’s jurisdiction; that is, that they were intended 
to affect the structure or function of the body.85 The dissent’s in-
terpretation selected that definition as its focal text. On this ap-
proach, the lawsuit’s central question was not whether Congress 
intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco individually, but 
whether tobacco was an “article . . . intended to affect the struc-
ture or any function of the body.” 
Selecting the statutory text allowed the dissent to posit that 
the FDCA gave the agency jurisdiction not over individual ob-
jects, but over a category of objects. Whether Congress specifically 
intended for the agency to regulate tobacco was, on this ap-
proach, immaterial. The jurisdictional provision authorized the 
agency to regulate objects insofar as they possessed certain 
characteristics.86 This suggested a dynamic category: objects 
could move in or out of jurisdictional scope depending on how 
manufacturers treated them and what scientists knew about 
them. Selecting the jurisdictional provision made specific con-
gressional intent about any given object irrelevant. 
Note again the limits of textualism and purposivism in ana-
lyzing these opinions. Textualism would argue strongly for fo-
cusing on the statute’s jurisdictional grant and stopping there. 
Allowing the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco may have seemingly 
 
 83 Id at 163 (Breyer dissenting) (“The inferences that the majority draws from later 
legislative history are not persuasive, since . . . one can just as easily infer from the later 
laws that Congress did not intend to affect the FDA’s tobacco-related authority at all.”). 
 84 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 163 (Breyer dissenting). 
 85 Id at 162 (Breyer dissenting). 
 86 See id at 165 (Breyer dissenting). 
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absurd results, such as forcing the FDA to ban tobacco products, 
but textualists have a high tolerance for absurd results.87 In any 
event, those results are absurd only in light of statutes enacted 
decades later, and later statutes do not reveal what the provi-
sion meant at the time it was enacted. Textualist tenets thus do 
favor selecting a particular text—the one chosen by Breyer in 
dissent. Purposivist tenets would argue for looking to the goals 
of the enacting Congress by reading the FDCA’s legislative his-
tory, considering the fate of earlier drug regulation, and relating 
the jurisdictional definition to other provisions. Purposivist te-
nets thus also argue for a particular selection—and again it is 
the one selected by Breyer’s dissent. The majority instead looked 
to later-enacted statutes’ implications for the FDA’s ability to 
ban tobacco, a selection that neither textualist nor purposivist 
tenets support. The utility of these theories for explaining or 
predicting the selections in Brown & Williamson is, as with the 
other cases I have discussed, quite limited. 
This Section shows that selecting focal text is a primary way 
opinions stake their claims, frame their arguments, and make 
their conclusions seem inevitable. My discussion also indicates 
that purposivism and, especially, textualism are of limited benefit 
in predicting, assessing, or even recognizing selection practices. 
Purposivism might tell judges to look to the legislature’s goals, 
and textualism might tell them to enforce the textual deals the 
legislature struck. These exhortations make sense only with ref-
erence to some focal text: What was the goal of the provision? 
What deal did this phrase represent? Yet, as this Section has 
shown, a commitment to an interpretive theory is at best a weak 
predictor of how a judge will select that focal text. The decisive 
moment of text selection thus goes unacknowledged. 
Seeing selection clearly, in contrast, helps statutory inter-
pretation analysis catch up to litigation practices: litigants’ 
briefs often suggest particular text selections to judges.88 Judges 
may be receptive to some such suggestions out of a commitment 
to a particular interpretive theory. But as this Section shows, 
 
 87 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2391 (2003) 
(“If one accepts the textualist critique of strong intentionalism, it is difficult to sustain 
the absurdity doctrine.”). 
 88 For instance, the respondents’ brief in Sweet Home argued, “While much atten-
tion has focused on the meaning of ‘harm,’ the operative statutory term is ‘take.’ It is the 
‘take’ of listed wildlife, as defined in the ESA, that § 9 forbids.” Brief for Respondents, 
Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, Docket No 94-859, 
*18 (US filed Mar 24, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 130541). 
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these theories often have at best an oblique relation to text se-
lection practices. Recognizing this can push us to consider what 
other underlying values and views—about the relations among 
laws, government institutions, or policies—might motivate text 
selection.89 
B. Selecting Constitutes a Case 
As my examples demonstrate, judges have a range of op-
tions when selecting the text “at issue” in a case. Should they se-
lect a concept or object raised by the litigation (tobacco products 
in Brown & Williamson’s majority)? Or select statutory text 
(FDA jurisdiction over products “intended to affect the human 
body” in Brown & Williamson’s dissent)? Should they select a 
swatch that resonates with legal concepts outside the statute 
(“take” as a common-law term in the Sweet Home dissent)? One 
that resonates with everyday speech (“established by the State” 
for the King dissent)? Or one grounded in the statute itself 
(“take” as “harm” per the statutory definition for the Sweet 
Home majority; “an Exchange . . . under section 1311” for the 
King majority)? Should they treat a phrase as a consolidated set 
piece (Smith’s “use-a-firearm” dissent)? Or take each word as a 
separate unit of meaning and add their meanings together 
(Smith’s “use + firearm” majority)? Choices about selecting focal 
text abound. 
Judicial opinions show a range of attitudes toward their text 
selection choices. Some directly address the issue. The Sweet 
Home dissent excoriated the majority for focusing on harm when 
the “operative” word was take,90 while the majority dismissed the 
criticism by noting that harm was how “Congress explicitly de-
fined” that “operative term.”91 The Brown & Williamson majority 
explicitly declined to address the operative statutory text, while 
the dissent argued that that text sufficed to decide the issue. 
Other opinions acknowledge text selection indirectly. The Smith 
dissent characterized the majority’s focus on use in isolation 
from the rest of the idiom as a misguided interpretation, rather 
than a parsing choice.92 Yet other opinions simply do not 
acknowledge how disagreements about meaning are structured 
around underlying divergences in the text to which meaning is 
 
 89 I elaborate on this suggestion in Part IV.B. 
 90 Sweet Home, 515 US at 717 (Scalia dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 91 Id at 697 n 10 (Stevens). 
 92 Smith, 508 US at 242 (Scalia dissenting). 
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ascribed. The two sides in King, for instance, debate the mean-
ing of the focal text without noting that their differing focal text 
selections underlie the reasoning of their conclusions. But 
whether or not they discuss it, authors of opinions must select 
text to interpret. 
The fact that text selection is often tacit, in other words, 
should not suggest that it is not at the same time active. One 
can think of text selection as a technique of interpretation along 
the lines of the sociologist Professor Marcel Mauss’s classic 
Techniques of the Body.93 Mauss notes that people perform seem-
ingly intuitive bodily movements differently in different cul-
tures. The way one walks, runs, throws—for “every attitude of 
the body[,] [e]ach society has its own special habits.”94 These 
“techniques” are the “effective and traditional” ways of doing 
things among a particular group of people.95 Such techniques of 
the body, although learned, can come to feel so intuitive that 
they seem natural. Such naturalization can help individuals fit 
comfortably into the societies that practice these techniques: 
they come to naturally walk the way they have been taught to.96 
So, similarly, judges educated in the tradition of American opin-
ion writing can select texts intuitively, without meaning to or 
realizing it. Yet, like walkers, they still participate in this effec-
tive and traditional technique of interpretation. 
Moreover, judges do not select from a predetermined set of 
choices but display creativity in selecting focal texts. Here, I 
have outlined a few recurring types of choices that judges make 
when writing opinions. These moves do not form a strict taxon-
omy but a dynamic range; there are surely examples of other 
choices, as well as examples that blur the boundaries between 
these options in creative ways. The point is that writers of opin-
ions select what text to interpret whether or not they 
acknowledge, or even realize, that they are doing so.97 
 
 93 See generally Marcel Mauss, Techniques of the Body, 2 Economy & Society 
70 (1973). 
 94 Id at 71–72. 
 95 Id at 75. 
 96 Mauss quotes an ethnography describing how Maori mothers “drilled their 
daughters” in walking with the “gait . . . admired” in their society. Id at 74. Although 
this was how women walked in that society, “[t]his was an acquired, not a natural way of 
walking.” Id. In fact, Mauss continues, “there is perhaps no ‘natural way’ for the adult” 
to walk—all walks are learned in particular social settings. Id. 
 97 The extent to which text selection choices are conscious is a question that lies 
beyond the scope of this Article, and would often not be discernible from the text of the 
opinions analyzed here. 
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I am sure readers have themselves noticed some of what I 
point out in this Part; anyone who teaches these cases is famil-
iar with their contours. But I believe I am the first to recognize 
the selection of focal text as a pervasive factor in statutory in-
terpretation opinions. My contention finds support in anthropo-
logical and linguistic studies of communication, which show that 
being the focus of discussion is not a natural or inherent feature 
of an event, object, or text. Rather, the process of communication 
itself leads things to occupy that focal role.98 This means that be-
ing focal is always a contingent and potentially temporary state. 
Something that emerges as a focal point in one communicative 
situation does not necessarily do so in another. What partici-
pants treat as focal depends on a range of factors: the particular-
ities of the communicative interaction; its larger social setting; 
and all the constraints of communicative genre, social structure, 
and power relations that go along with them.99 
Moreover, the emergence of a focal object has a dynamic re-
lationship to the background within which it is understood. Text 
and context create one another in the communicative encounter. 
A “focal event” emerges through communication as “the phe-
nomenon being contextualized.”100 Just as the background inter-
action allows a particular object to emerge as a joint focus of at-
tention, it is the emergence of an object as a focus of attention 
that allows everything else to be characterized as background. 
What participants “treat as ‘focal’ and what as ‘background’” is 
not predictable;101 each constructs the other in the process of 
communication. 
To give a feel for how this co-constitutive relation works, 
imagine someone driving down a street. She may be thinking 
about a range of things—a lecture she just attended, what to 
have for dinner, how brightly the sun is shining. At the corner 
stands a stop sign. She feels the little jolt the car gives when it 
stops and continues across the street. Is the stop sign a focal 
text? Perhaps not. Today, it may just slip into other background 
considerations: lecture, dinner, sun. But if a police officer pulls 
the driver over for failing to come to a complete stop, the stop 
 
 98 See Charles Goodwin and Alessandro Duranti, Rethinking Context: An Introduc-
tion, in Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin, eds, Rethinking Context: Language as 
an Interactive Phenomenon 1, 3 (Cambridge 1992). 
 99 Id at 6–9. 
 100 Id at 3. 
 101 Id. 
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sign might click into focus. She might insist that she did, too, 
come to a complete stop. Suddenly, that little jolt she felt be-
comes meaningful, pointing in a new way to the focal stop sign. 
She might wonder if she was distracted by her thoughts about 
the lecture, or blinded by the setting sun, so that she did not fully 
notice the stop sign. A range of factors comes together, config-
ured in a particular constellation around the focal text, as the 
interaction progresses. Or, again, maybe there is no police officer 
and the stop sign never makes the leap from background to fo-
cus. Perhaps instead her thoughts coalesce around dinner, and 
hunger takes center stage. 
This way of moving something from background to object of 
focus is called entextualization.102 The entextualizing “process [ ] 
render[s] discourse extractable” and “mak[es] a stretch of lin-
guistic production into a unit—a text—that can be lifted out of 
its [ ] setting.”103 Neither stop sign nor dinner is inherently focal. 
But they may become entextualized through a particular com-
municative experience (with another or with oneself). The con-
cept of entextualization highlights the dynamic, interactive, and 
creative nature of meaning production. A text becomes focal 
through the very act of people focusing on it: “[a] text . . . is dis-
course rendered decontextualizable.”104 
Judicial opinions present a particular form of communica-
tion. Their specific conventions differentiate them from other 
communicative genres, as does the fact that they arise from, and 
resolve, disputes.105 Yet, for all their particularities, judicial 
opinions also present a form of communication. One can there-
fore expect that at least some patterns structuring most forms of 
communication will also appear in judicial opinions. Insights 
from studies of language and communication cannot predict the 
analysis of legal texts, but they can certainly guide it. 
 
 102 Richard Bauman and Charles L. Briggs, Poetics and Performance as Critical Per-
spectives on Language and Social Life, 19 Ann Rev Anthropology 59, 73 (1990). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 For my purposes here, two characteristics stand out as particularly important. 
First, judicial opinions are performative, or creative, not only in the everyday senses of 
those words, but in the technical linguistic sense that they help constitute the very things 
they refer to in the world. Part IV elaborates on this assertion. Second, judicial opinions in 
our system of adjudication ground their legitimacy in reason-giving. Mathilde Cohen, The 
Rule of Law as the Rule of Reasons, 96 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie [Archives 
Phil L & Soc Phil] 1, 2 (2010) (“[L]egal reason giving is one of the essential properties of 
the concept of the rule of law, if not the essential one.”). Part IV explains how my ap-
proach helps evaluate this function. 
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This Part shows that the active selection of focal text is in-
deed a central—though underappreciated—aspect of how judi-
cial opinions rationalize their communications and exert their 
effects on the world. Negotiations over focus and background in 
ordinary communication happen within accepted rhetorical 
genres and cultural understandings. Similarly, judicial opinions’ 
selecting of focal text is constrained by conventions of legal ar-
gument and influenced by how litigants and lower courts frame a 
case. Nevertheless, just as with ordinary communication, select-
ing focal text is a necessary, and sometimes contested, practice. 
Showing that judges must select the text they interpret illu-
minates how opinions help create the objects of their own analy-
sis. When an opinion asserts, “This case is about . . . ,” it does not 
merely present a neutral description. Rather, it constitutes the 
case as being about a particular question; or at least, it attempts 
to do so. This phrase is thus properly understood not as a de-
scription, but as an argument: an argument phrased as a de-
scription. It is a kind of “hidden polemic,” which utters its own 
“word with a sideward glance at someone else’s hostile word,”106 
in this case, at other things that someone else could say the case 
was about. 
The assertion that a case is “about” something is thus a cre-
ative utterance, a speech act: an efficacious communication that 
does not merely describe, but helps create, the world it refers 
to.107 But, being phrased as merely a passive description, it is a 
speech act that disguises its own efficacious quality. This veneer 
of nonefficacy allows judges’ choices about what they will inter-
pret to appear as passive descriptions of, or references to, objec-
tive facts that are not in their control. Perhaps it is this seeming 
objectivity that has obscured the central importance of selecting 
to statutory interpretation. 
III.  SITUATING: CREATING A CONTEXT FOR FOCAL TEXT 
I began the preceding Part with a question: How do judges 
know what text to interpret? The answer, I showed, was that 
 
 106 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Heteroglot Novel, in Pam Morris, ed, The Bakhtin Reader: 
Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev and Voloshinov 88, 107–08 (Edward Arnold 
1994) (contrasting “[o]vert polemic . . . directed at another’s discourse, which it refutes,” 
with “hidden polemic,” in which “discourse is directed toward an ordinary referential ob-
ject, . . . only indirectly striking a blow at the other’s discourse, clashing with it, as it 
were, within the [referential] object itself ”). 
 107 For a fuller discussion of speech acts and creative utterances, see Part IV.C. 
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judges actively select text to interpret. But to interpret a text, 
one needs to situate it in a broader context: “The assignment of a 
local meaning to [a] given utterance depends on more global con-
textual relations which are selectively invoked and activated by 
discourse participants.”108 How, then, do judges situate a focal 
text within an encompassing context through which it gains 
meaning? Commentators often act as though texts naturally 
carried their own contexts. Attention tends to focus on how a 
judge interprets the implications of such a context, rather than 
on where that context comes from. A closer look, however, re-
veals that situating focal text is far from a natural, obvious, or 
presumable process. Like selecting text to begin with, situating 
it requires creative judicial labor. 
To situate a text, judges must find some aspects of the world 
relevant to interpreting it. They are of course constrained by the 
conventions of legal reasoning. But even within those con-
straints, the factors available to situate a focal text far exceed 
what any opinion could actually use. So judges must choose fac-
tors within which to situate a text. Is a given legal text best un-
derstood when situated against the background of related statu-
tory provisions, or facts about the physical world the statute 
addresses? Should one understand it by reference to principles 
that pervade the law or patterns that characterize ordinary con-
versation? Opinions tend to make the answers to such questions 
seem more obvious than they are.109 
Because a range of options is always available, opinions sit-
uating focal text stake a claim that their preferred factors are 
the ones relevant to interpretation. Relevance, in other words, is 
 
 108 Paul J. Thibault, Communicating and Interpreting Relevance through Discourse 
Negotiation: An Alternative to Relevance Theory–a Reply to Franken, 31 J Pragmatics 
557, 560 (1999). See also, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 37 (cited in 
note 6) (“In textual interpretation, context is everything.”); Fallon, 99 Cornell L Rev at 
687 (cited in note 6), citing Manning, 106 Colum L Rev at 73, 79–80 (cited in note 6) (stat-
ing that textualists and purposivists “concur . . . [that] the meaning of the words of a stat-
ute . . . depends on context”); Siegel, 78 BU L Rev at 1027–28 (cited in note 36) (noting 
that textualists agree with intentionalists that “text is not self-interpreting and that text 
takes its meaning from and must be understood in context”); Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 16, 32–33 (Thomson/West 2012). 
 109 I suggest why the genre is oriented this way in Part IV. The extent to which in-
dividual judges strive to make their situating choices seem inevitable, and whether they 
do so consciously or simply as part of a technique of interpretation, are interesting ques-
tions that lie beyond the scope of this Article. Here, I address not the individual psychol-
ogy of judges but the efficacy and structure of judicial opinions. 
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made, not born.110 Making something relevant to interpretation 
is a “dynamic and contingent” social process in which “conflict 
and misunderstanding” play a “regular role,” putting various in-
terpretive possibilities “‘at risk’ at any given moment in the un-
folding discursive activity.”111 Relatedly, when invoking a situa-
tional factor, an opinion must attribute some characteristics to 
it: a related statutory provision says this; a physical fact is that 
way; a general legal principle holds something; ordinary conver-
sation works a certain way. When creating contexts within 
which to situate texts, in other words, opinions stake claims 
about both relevance and reality. 
The following Sections show how judges situate focal text 
within a range of sources. While I divide my discussion into the 
overarching categories of legal and nonlegal sources, this Part 
illustrates that each category contains a diversity of possibilities 
for situating text.112 Judges creating contexts may consciously 
consider why particular factors seem more relevant than others, 
and they may actively learn about the characteristics of the fac-
tors they invoke. But they also may not.113 As with selecting text, 
 
 110 See Fallon, 99 Cornell L Rev at 695 (cited in note 6) (“There . . . could be[ ] no 
purely non-normative criterion precisely marking what should be deemed relevant or 
irrelevant.”). This is as true for textual interpretation as it is for constructing group 
identities, which ask people to interpret themselves and their place in the world around 
them with reference to factors that are highly influenced by local cultural norms, under-
standings of selfhood, and desiderata of legitimacy. See Anya Bernstein, Parameters of 
Legitimation and the Environmental Future of a Taipei Neighborhood, in Sylvia Hood 
Washington, Paul C. Rosier, and Heather Goodall, eds, Echoes from the Poisoned Well: 
Global Memories of Environmental Injustice 311, 315–17 (Lexington 2006). 
 111 Thibault, 31 J Pragmatics at 561 (cited in note 108). Although I talk a lot about 
relevance here, I do not subscribe to what is known as “relevance theory,” which places 
ultimate meanings in the speaker’s thoughts rather than in the discursive elaboration of 
utterances. Id (“Relevance theory [ ] assumes that . . . the speaker’s thought[ ] is privi-
leged in the interpretation of utterances.”). In other words, I see communication and 
meaning-making as a fundamentally social, interactive practice. 
 112 In a classic article, Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey argued that 
the Supreme Court “considers a broad range of textual, historical, and evolutive evidence 
when it interprets statutes.” Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 322 (cited in note 
7). I add to their analysis by both broadening and specifying that range, showing both 
how opinions often go further afield and how they cut up the categories Eskridge and 
Frickey identify in varied ways. 
 113 The psychological processes of situating a text—whether it is conscious or pur-
poseful, what judges feel about it—reveal little about whether these practices occur and 
how they structure judicial opinions. Evidence for such psychological processes, more-
over, resides in the invisible inner states of individual judges. I eschew discussion about 
how judges think or what they feel. Rather, I base my analysis on the written products 
that judges have made available. These may not reveal judges’ inner states, but they do 
reveal something more important: the practices and structures that shape these effica-
cious legal utterances. 
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judges must make choices about situating text whether they re-
alize it or not. And as this Part shows, opinion-writing conven-
tions impose few constraints on judges to explain why the fac-
tors they invoke are the most pertinent or to substantiate their 
characterizations of those factors—few constraints, that is, on 
judicial claims about either relevance or reality. This leaves 
judges with a great deal of freedom when choosing how to situ-
ate focal text. 
A. How Opinions Situate in Legal Sources 
Not surprisingly, judicial opinions often turn to legal stric-
tures to help interpret statutory terms. But the law is a multi-
farious thing, and opinions travel widely in it. They look within 
the statute they interpret and outside it; they turn to legal un-
derstandings that precede the statute, postdate it, and coincide 
with its enactment; and they draw on overarching, abstract 
principles. Law’s internal diversity gives writers a range of legal 
factors so broad that opinions can use legal factors to support 
opposing interpretations. Situating statutory text against the 
background of “the corpus juris”114 thus does not necessarily con-
strain interpretation or make it predictable. Because opinions do 
not often directly challenge one another’s claims about the rele-
vance of a legal factor, however, each can present its chosen 
sources as the exclusive keys to interpretation. Picking and 
choosing within the vast legal realm, opinions present their 
claims about relevance as facts, rather than as arguments. 
1. Intrastatutory and extrastatutory legal sources. 
Think back to Sweet Home, in which the majority and the 
dissent selected different words in the statute as the focal text 
for interpretation.115 What factors did each opinion consider rel-
evant to interpreting its text? The majority looked first within 
the statute itself. Recall that the Act made it “unlawful for any 
person . . . to . . . take” endangered animals.116 The statute de-
fined “take” as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect.”117 The agency said that “harm” in this 
 
 114 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 6). See also Siegel, 78 
BU L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 36) (discussing this passage). 
 115 See text accompanying notes 21–34. 
 116 Sweet Home, 515 US at 690–91, quoting 16 USC § 1538(a)(1). 
 117 Sweet Home, 515 US at 691, quoting 16 USC § 1532(19). 
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definition included incidental habitat modification, and chal-
lengers objected. The majority opinion focused on the word 
“harm.” Responding to the dissent’s claim that “take” should be 
the focus of interpretation because it was the legally “operative” 
word,118 the majority directed attention back to the statute: 
“Congress explicitly defined the operative term ‘take’ in the 
[statute], . . . thereby obviating the need for us to probe its 
meaning.”119 
The majority took what I call an intrastatutory approach. It 
situated its focal text within the context of the statute. An opin-
ion that uses intrastatutory factors to situate a focal text might 
invoke fairly explicit statutory statements, such as definitions or 
commands that specifically address the focal text. It might also 
invoke fairly implicit statutory indications by drawing infer-
ences from other provisions. The Sweet Home majority did both. 
It drew on the explicit statutory definition of “take,” which in-
cluded “harm.” It also drew on an implication of the 1982 
amendment allowing permits for incidental takings, from which 
the majority inferred that incidental takings were otherwise 
prohibited by the statute. Explicitness and implicitness, of 
course, are not absolute or binary; they are merely useful no-
tions for exploring the range of intrastatutory factors that opin-
ions draw on. 
The Sweet Home dissent, in contrast, took what I call an 
extrastatutory approach. Although it focused on the statutory 
term “take,” the dissent situated that word in earlier law. The 
legal term “take,” the dissent insisted, was “as old as the law it-
self.”120 Its relevant context was, accordingly, also old. The dis-
sent therefore looked to an older, historically situated extrastat-
utory understanding: that of the common law, a historical period 
that preceded the statute’s enactment. 
Returning to Sweet Home highlights how the selection of fo-
cal text sets an opinion’s interpretive orientation. Focusing on 
take makes it easy to invoke common-law understandings, be-
cause the word has such a long pedigree. Focusing on harm 
makes it easy to invoke more modern and less intentional un-
derstandings, because the word lacks those common-law connec-
tions and has a broad range of meaning. Thus, each focal text fa-
cilitates the making-relevant of a different range of factors. 
 
 118 Sweet Home, 515 US at 717 (Scalia dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 119 Id at 697 n 10. 
 120 Id at 717 (Scalia dissenting). 
BERNSTEIN_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017  11:22 AM 
598  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:567 
   
Crucially, the factors that both opinions draw on are legal: 
both make relevant a context of legal pronouncement. But their 
shared invocation of legal understandings does not lead them to 
shared conclusions. That is because the legal factors they draw 
on come from different conceptual and historical locations: one 
intrastatutory, the other extrastatutory in a period that pre-
cedes the statute. That difference allows the opinions to invoke 
factors that are equally legal in character to bolster completely 
different interpretations. 
2. Sources preceding or contemporaneous with the statute. 
It may seem that the Sweet Home opinions were able to 
support contrasting interpretations because one looked inside 
the statute while the other looked outside it. But extrastatutory 
legal sources alone can also bolster opposing conclusions. In 
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co v Knudson,121 for in-
stance, the majority situated the text in an extrastatutory con-
text that preceded the statute’s enactment, while the dissent 
looked to legal meanings that were contemporaneous with the 
statute. 
In Knudson, an injured person received money through a 
settlement; her insurer sought to recoup the funds to offset 
money it had paid out for her.122 The insurer claimed that the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974123 (ERISA) 
allowed this recovery when it authorized a party “to obtain [ ] 
appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce any provisions of the 
[insurance] plan.”124 Justice Scalia, writing for five justices, con-
cluded that the “equitable” relief permitted by ERISA included 
only “those categories of relief that were typically available in 
equity” as it was “[i]n the days of the divided bench.”125 Although 
the majority opinion did not specify a precise time period from 
which the authoritative meaning of “equitable” should be de-
rived, this approach clearly limited the relevant context to an 
 
 121 534 US 204 (2002). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Stevens dis-
sented. Justice Ginsburg also filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Stevens and 
Justices Souter and Breyer. Id at 206. 
 122 Id at 207–09. 
 123 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829. 
 124 Knudson, 534 US at 209 (ellipsis omitted), quoting ERISA § 502(a)(3), 88 Stat at 
891, codified as amended at 29 USC § 1132(a)(3). 
 125 Knudson, 534 US at 210–12, quoting Mertens v Hewitt Associates, 508 US 248, 
256 (1993). 
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era that preceded the 1938 unification of law and equity in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.126 
Four dissenting justices found it “fanciful” to claim that the 
relevant time period for understanding ERISA’s use of “equita-
ble” preceded the statute’s enactment by decades.127 There was 
little reason “to assume that in 1974 Congress intended to revive 
the obsolete distinctions between law and equity” as they existed 
before 1938.128 On the contrary, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
wrote in dissent, legal understandings of equity continued to de-
velop after the courts of equity were abolished. “[E]quity [ ] was 
and should remain an evolving and dynamic jurisprudence.”129 
The dissent interpreted equitable with reference to the meaning 
that legal professionals would have ascribed to it at the time the 
statute was written.130 Thus, majority and dissent agreed that 
the proper context for interpretation lay in extrastatutory legal 
sources: pronouncements outside ERISA itself. But rather than 
invoking the relevance of developments that preceded the stat-
ute, the dissent invoked understandings contemporaneous with 
the statute’s passage. Each opinion thus claimed the relevance 
of a different time period’s legal understandings. 
Observers can disagree over which interpretation in Knudson 
is more correct. But it is difficult to take a stand on the matter 
without also having an opinion about the relative relevance of the 
historical eras each opinion invokes to support its interpretation. 
 
 126 See FRCP 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”); Stephen N. Subrin, 
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U Pa L Rev 909, 912 (1987) (arguing that equity principles endure in, 
and perhaps dominate, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 127 Knudson, 534 US at 221–22 (Stevens dissenting) (characterizing Ginsburg’s dis-
senting opinion). 
 128 Id (Stevens dissenting). 
 129 Id at 233 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 130 The Ginsburg dissent (and scholars) also challenged the majority’s understand-
ing of what the term would have meant in the days of the divided bench. See id at 229–
30 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“The[ ] cases establish what the Court . . . cannot dispute: Res-
titution was within the recognized power . . . of a court of equity.”) (quotation marks 
omitted); Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand L Rev 997, 
1000 (2015) (“Despite all [its] appeals to history and tradition [in Knudson and other 
equity-related cases], what the Court is offering is not something that most historians 
would recognize, for it does not reflect the complexity and contingency of equity’s 
past.”); Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 
1063, 1064 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court distorted history and equity to reach its re-
sult [in Knudson].”). Although it is not central to my point here, it is certainly worth not-
ing that invoking the relevance of a given historical era does not settle the interpretive 
question. An opinion must still make contestable assertions about what that historical 
era implied for a given legal text. 
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It is worth asking, then, whether the dominant theories of statu-
tory interpretation provide a basis on which to form such an 
opinion. 
Textualism urges judges to interpret a statutory term by 
following “the intent that a reasonable person would gather 
from the text . . . , placed alongside the remainder of the corpus 
juris.”131 To do that, a judge in Knudson might place the term 
alongside the corpus juris preceding the statute and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as the majority did. But she might just 
as well place it alongside the corpus juris of the time when the 
statute was passed, as did the dissent. Each choice facilitates a 
different outcome; yet textualist tenets could support either.132 
The corpus juris of textualist exhortation is a more static and 
unified object than the world of legal pronouncement that actual 
opinions consider. More tellingly, textualism does not even rec-
ognize that this act of situating requires a decision. 
Purposivism can explain the choices in Knudson somewhat 
better, because the range of sources it validates is not as static or 
confined. It can potentially incorporate this choice into its general 
goal of finding how the legislature understood a statute. Pur-
posivism could thus motivate invoking the contemporaneous law 
of equity by noting that the bulk of the enacting legislature’s legal 
experience postdated the unification of the divided bench. Still, 
purposivism, like textualism, does not explicitly recognize the 
choices judges must make when invoking extrastatutory factors. 
The debate in Knudson was thus not between using the cor-
pus juris and ignoring it. It was between making one part of the 
corpus juris relevant, as opposed to another. Looking at the par-
ticular factors that the Knudson opinions invoke, as I have here, 
reveals how judges claim relevance for distinct factors within 
what are sometimes described as internally undifferentiated 
fields.133 It also helps assess how well a prescriptive theory of 
statutory interpretation predicts or explains a given opinion’s 
choices—that is, how useful a given theory is in a particular case. 
 
 131 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 6). 
 132 To the extent that textualism gives judges reason to prefer one option, it would 
seem to favor looking to the law contemporaneous to the statute’s enactment, insofar as 
readers at that time would be likely to read the statute’s words as having the meanings 
most familiar to them. Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 33 (cited in note 108). But 
this was the option rejected in Knudson by the avowedly textualist Scalia. Knudson, 534 
US at 212–13. 
 133 See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and 
the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 549, 567–69 (2005). 
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3. Sources postdating the statute. 
I have discussed how opinions can draw on sources that 
precede the statute at issue, like the Sweet Home dissent and 
the Knudson majority; and on sources that coincide with it, like 
the Knudson dissent. Opinions can also look later, at events 
that postdate the statute’s enactment. Recall how the Brown & 
Williamson majority determined that, irrespective of whether 
tobacco products were “articles . . . intended to affect . . . the 
body,” Congress did not intend for the FDA to regulate them.134 
To reach that conclusion, the majority determined that laws 
passed from 1965 onward had implications for the FDCA, which 
was enacted in 1938. The majority thus claimed primary rele-
vance for legal assertions that postdated the statute’s passage. 
The dissent, in contrast, drew on contemporaneous expres-
sions of congressional attitude from the FDCA’s legislative his-
tory to argue that the statute conferred broad and dynamic ju-
risdiction on the FDA. This fairly standard use of legislative 
history to deduce congressional understanding has been criti-
cized for imputing a unitary mind to a multimember body—
treating Congress as an “it” rather than a “they.”135 The Brown 
& Williamson majority did not turn to legislative history, but it 
did attribute unity to a multimember body—and not just one 
multimember body but many different Congresses over time.136 
The opinion did not explain how subsequent laws revealed the 
meaning the FDCA had at the time it was enacted; nor did the 
majority claim that the preferences of later Congresses took 
precedence over those of the one that enacted the FDCA. Rather, 
it treated Congress like the ship of Theseus: maintaining a uni-
tary character despite continuous change to its component 
parts.137 
 
 134 See text accompanying notes 68–78. 
 135 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 239 (1992). This criticism has itself been criti-
cized as overly individualistic and insufficiently cognizant of the dynamics of group ac-
tion. See Nourse, 55 BC L Rev at 1615 (cited in note 65) (“Congress has the functional 
equivalent of intent.”). 
 136 See Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 155 (“Taken together, these actions by 
Congress over the past 35 years preclude an interpretation of the FDCA that grants the 
FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.”). 
 137 See Andre Gallois, Identity over Time (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Oct 6, 
2016), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-time (visited 
Mar 26, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). For a more detailed introduction to the phil-
osophical puzzle of the ship of Theseus, see generally Graeme S. Cumming and John 
Collier, Change and Identity in Complex Systems, 10 Ecol and Society 29 (June 2005). 
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Would textualism have predicted this recourse to subse-
quent statutes? Probably not. Then again, neither would pur-
posivism. As Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff has written, both 
purposivism and textualism are usually deployed as “archeologi-
cal” approaches that aim to uncover what a statute meant at the 
time it was enacted, not “nautical” approaches that see statutes 
developing as the legal landscape around them shifts.138 Breyer’s 
dissent, in contrast, started from the jurisdiction-granting text of 
the statute, in accordance with both textualist and purposivist 
principles, and proceeded to the legislative and statutory history, 
in accordance with purposivist tenets. The point, of course, is not 
to argue about whether a particular opinion is in fact textualist 
or purposivist. On the contrary, this discussion suggests that 
evaluating these opinions in the terms of textualism and pur-
posivism provides quite limited analytic purchase. In contrast, 
determining which legal factors they claim as relevant helps 
show how the opinions build their interpretive argument. It also, 
I argue, provides more substance to a normative evaluation of 
their conclusions than would a debate about the extent to which 
either adheres to a prescriptive theory of interpretation.139 
4. General legal principles. 
Aside from particular historical periods, opinions also some-
times situate focal texts within general legal principles that they 
present as timeless or fundamental. The opinions in Green v 
Bock Laundry Machine Co140 exemplify this recourse to general 
legal values.141 They also show that judges do not situate texts in 
such general principles only when more specific indications are 
unavailable. Rather, judges can choose to situate focal text within 
overarching, extrastatutory principles even when intrastatutory 
sources are available. 
 
 138 Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 21 (cited in note 6). 
 139 See Part IV.B. 
 140 490 US 504 (1989). Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, 
Justice Byron White, O’Connor, and Kennedy. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall. Id at 505. 
 141 Green concerned a provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which fall squarely 
within the realm of legal pronouncement, though they are not statutes. See id. For a dis-
cussion of the way that doctrine and scholarship generally do not distinguish Federal 
Rules from statutes, but why they ought to, see Lumen N. Mulligan and Glen 
Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 Minn L Rev *7–8 (forthcoming 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/39BV-ZGKP. 
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A prisoner on work release at a car wash sued the manu-
facturer of a machine that tore off his arm. The manufacturer 
successfully introduced evidence of the prisoner’s convictions. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) mandated that a judge admit 
evidence of a witness’s prior conviction “only if” its probative 
value outweighed “its prejudicial effect to the defendant.”142 
This provision made sense in the criminal context, in which 
a jury’s inappropriate prejudice against a witness with a crimi-
nal record poses more of a threat to defendants than to prosecu-
tors. But the defendant in Green was a corporation accused of 
causing an injury. The Rule thus created a strange asymmetry 
in civil litigation: the court had to admit any prior conviction evi-
dence prejudicial to the plaintiff, but could admit prior convic-
tion evidence prejudicial to the defendant only if its probative 
value outweighed that prejudicial effect. 
Each of the Court’s three opinions frankly admitted that it 
departed from the text to avoid this anomaly.143 But each situated 
the Rule in different legal factors to bolster that departure. The 
majority, written by Justice Stevens for five justices, invoked a 
general legal principle: procedural equality between parties to a 
civil suit. “No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we 
cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff 
the same right to impeach an adversary’s testimony that it 
grants to a civil defendant.”144 The Constitution grants special 
protections to criminal defendants,145 the opinion noted, but not 
to “civil litigants,” who “share equally the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,” who “almost always 
 
 142 Green, 490 US at 509 (emphasis added), quoting FRE 609(a) (1975). The Rule 
read, in relevant part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the wit-
ness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted . . . only if the crime [ ] 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . , and the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the defendant. 
Green, 490 US at 509, quoting FRE 609(a) (1975). 
 143 See Green, 490 US at 509 (Stevens) (“[The] literal reading would compel an odd 
result in a case like this.”); id at 527 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f interpreted 
literally, [the provision] produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.”); id 
at 530 (Blackmun dissenting) (“The majority concludes that Rule 609(a)(1) cannot mean 
what it says on its face. . . . I fully agree.”). 
 144 Id at 510. 
 145 These include the Fifth Amendment’s option “not to testify at trial” and the 
Sixth Amendment’s grant of “certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the prosecution.” Id 
at 510–11. 
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must testify,” and who often take the role of plaintiff or defen-
dant more or less by “happenstance[,] based on which party filed 
first or on the nature of the suit.”146 Given this, “[i]t is unfath-
omable why a civil plaintiff—but not a civil defendant—should 
be subjected to th[e] risk” of mandatory admission of damaging 
evidence.147 With the principle of civil party equality in the 
background, the majority provided a thorough survey of com-
munications surrounding and preceding the Rule’s passage, 
concluding that Congress intended that the Rule protect only 
criminal defendants.148 
Concurring, Scalia agreed with the majority’s interpreta-
tion.149 He also situated the Rule within a general background 
legal principle; but he chose a different one. Instead of a pro-
scription on arbitrary distinctions between civil litigants, the 
concurrence invoked “the policy of the law in general and the 
Rules of Evidence in particular of providing special protection to 
defendants in criminal cases.”150 Against this background, it 
would make sense for the Rule to give criminal defendants pro-
tections that it denied others.151 
Neither opinion cited any sources for the general legal prin-
ciples it invoked. The majority’s fleeting references showed that 
the Constitution created no distinctions between civil parties, 
not that it prohibited such distinctions.152 The concurrence, like-
wise, called the Rule’s literal meaning “absurd, and perhaps un-
constitutional,”153 but did not specify which constitutional provi-
sion it might violate. It asserted that reading the Rule to single 
out criminal defendants accorded with “the policy of the law in 
 
 146 Id at 510. 
 147 Green, 490 US at 510–11. 
 148 Id at 522–24. 
 149 See id at 527–30 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 150 Id at 529 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). The concurrence thus found it 
“[q]uite obvious[ ]” that the majority’s reading of the Rule to give special protection only 
to criminal defendants “does the least violence to the text.” Id. 
 151 Green, 490 US at 529 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 152 The majority did not, for instance, consider whether some procedural inequalities 
between civil parties might be allowed, and under what circumstances. How, for in-
stance, would the majority approach a supplemental jurisdiction provision that allows 
defendants, but not plaintiffs, in a civil suit to join parties who would destroy diversity of 
citizenship? See 28 USC § 1367(b). Such inequality may be justified with reference to 
other values, but the majority opinion did not consider what kind of justification might 
be required. Similarly, one could imagine a legislative policy of discouraging unnecessary 
lawsuits by providing extra protections for civil defendants. The majority opinion neither 
considered such a possibility nor evaluated the constitutional issues it might raise. 
 153 Green, 490 US at 527 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
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general and the Rules . . . in particular,”154 but identified no text 
articulating such a policy, either in the Rules or elsewhere.155 
Each opinion thus situated the Rule within a general legal prin-
ciple, but provided no textual basis for its principle. Neither ex-
plained why its chosen principle, and not another, should de-
termine the interpretation. 
Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent, for three justices, opted 
instead for intrastatutory factors. Rule 102 “specif[ied] that [the 
Rules] ‘shall be construed to secure fairness in administration 
. . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined’ in all cases.”156 Moreover, because “the 
Rules . . . by their terms govern both civil and criminal proceed-
ings,”157 the dissent “d[id] not approach the Rules . . . with the 
presumption that their general provisions should be read to 
‘provid[e] special protection to defendants in criminal cases’” or 
otherwise distinguish between criminal and civil litigants.158 For 
the dissent, the literal reading of the Rule was unacceptable not 
because it arbitrarily distinguished between civil parties or be-
cause it failed to treat criminal defendants better than others, 
but because it risked undermining the fairness, truth, and jus-
tice that the Rules themselves identified as their principles. 
Based on these intrastatutory indications, the dissent read the 
Rule to require judges to determine whether the probative value 
of prior conviction evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect on a 
party, rather than only a criminal defendant.159 Intrastatutory 
 
 154 Id at 529 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). In keeping with the general nature 
of this allusion to legal principles, the concurrence cited no legal stricture or Rule provi-
sion expressing special solicitude for criminal defendants. 
 155 Similarly, the concurrence stated that its goal was to find the reading that was 
the most “compatible with the surrounding body of law” without referring to any particu-
lar text or aspect of that body of law. Id at 528 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 156 Id at 533 (Blackmun dissenting) (emphasis omitted and ellipsis in original), quot-
ing FRE 102 (1975). 
 157 Green, 490 US at 533 (Blackmun dissenting). 
 158 Id (Blackmun dissenting), quoting id at 529 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 159 See id at 533 (Blackmun dissenting). The dissent cited support in the conference 
committee’s report, which found the possibility that prior conviction evidence would 
damage the integrity of the lawsuit intolerable, but declined to ask judges to consider the 
“danger of prejudice to a . . . [nondefendant] witness’ reputation.” Id at 531–32 
(Blackmun dissenting), quoting Federal Rules of Evidence Conference Report, HR Conf 
Rep No 93-1597, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 9–10 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7098, 7103. 
The report thus focused not on maintaining equality between parties or protecting crim-
inal defendants, but on excluding evidence that “present[ed] a danger of improperly in-
fluencing the outcome of the trial.” Green, 490 US at 532 (Blackmun dissenting), quoting 
HR Conf Rep No 93-1597 at 9 (cited in note 159). Green, in which evidence of a conviction 
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factors, then, may be available even when a majority of justices 
choose not to draw on them to situate the text. 
A close look at Green reveals again the limited analytic ben-
efit of textualism and purposivism. The majority’s use of legisla-
tive history is guided by adherence to a background principle 
that it grounds in neither text nor indications of purpose. The 
concurrence rejects the majority’s use of legislative history on 
textualist grounds, but itself relies on an assertion about law in 
general that is not rooted in any textual source.160 Neither men-
tions any intrastatutory indications of meaning. The dissent, in 
turn, grounds its analysis in the text of the Rules themselves—
and specifically in a part of the text that expresses the Rules’ 
purpose. It is thus both the most textualist and the most purpos-
ive of the opinions. 
Is the opinions’ failure to comport to prescriptive theories a 
problem? If so, I would suggest it is a problem for the theories. 
While they may provide a way for opinion writers to declare 
their allegiances, the terms of textualism and purposivism do 
little to help explain how these opinions create contexts for the 
text they interpret. And as Green indicates, the theories do little 
to guide these choices. My analysis, in contrast, illuminates the 
way judges situate text within a range of contextual factors; how 
they claim those factors’ relevance for interpretation; and the ex-
tent to which they substantiate their depictions of those factors. 
5. Multiple sources. 
A final example demonstrates how opinions can creatively 
combine various legal sources when situating a focal text. In Bob 
Jones University v United States,161 a statute exempted nonprofit 
 
not relevant to the liability claim stood to damage the integrity of the trial, presented 
precisely this kind of danger. 
 160 Scalia wrote separately to object to the majority’s detailed legislative and preleg-
islative history, which he found irrelevant to determining the meaning of the text: 
I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials . . . to verify that 
what seems to us an unthinkable disposition (civil defendants but not civil 
plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing prejudice) was indeed unthought of, 
and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word “defen-
dant” in the Rule. For that purpose, however, it would suffice to observe that 
counsel have not provided, nor have we discovered, a shred of evidence that 
anyone has ever proposed or assumed such a bizarre disposition. 
Green, 490 US at 527 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 161 461 US 574 (1983). Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. Justice Lewis F. 
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“[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable . . . or educational purposes” from tax liabil-
ity.162 For much of the twentieth century, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) had applied this exemption to all schools, but in 
1970 it announced that schools that discriminated on the basis 
of race were no longer eligible for tax exemption.163 Two schools 
sued, claiming they were entitled to tax exemption irrespective 
of their racial policies.164 
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger 
for seven justices,165 situated the provision within common-law 
understandings, asserting that the educational tax exemption 
“was intended to express the basic common law concept of 
‘charity,’”166 which required that an institution must “serve a 
public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.”167 
Like the Sweet Home dissent, the Bob Jones majority thus saw 
common-law understandings as constraining the meanings of 
words in the statute. 
To figure out what “established public policy” comprised, 
however, the opinion looked neither to common-law notions nor 
to the time at which the statute was enacted, but to its own con-
temporary setting—the time at which the IRS had instituted its 
policy. Canvassing recent judicial decisions, congressional legis-
lation, and executive action regarding racial discrimination, the 
 
Powell Jr joined in Part III of the majority opinion and also wrote an opinion concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment. Rehnquist dissented. Id at 576. 
 162 Id at 585 (ellipses and brackets in original), quoting 26 USC § 501(c)(3). 
 163 Bob Jones, 461 US at 577–78. 
 164 The case involved two religious educational institutions. Bob Jones University 
began accepting African Americans married “within their race” in 1971. Id at 580. After 
a Supreme Court decision prohibited racial exclusion from private schools in 1975, Bob 
Jones began admitting unmarried African Americans, but its student code of conduct 
prohibited engaging in or advocating interracial relationships. Id at 580–81. Goldsboro 
Christian Schools was a K–12 private school that had a policy of accepting only whites 
or, sometimes, students with one white parent. Id at 583. 
 165 Powell added an eighth vote to Part III of the majority opinion, which rejected 
the schools’ argument that the denial of a tax exemption constituted religious regulation 
in violation of the First Amendment. See id at 606 (Powell concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); id at 602–04 (Burger) (discussing appellants’ religious freedom 
arguments). The concurrence seemed to accept the majority’s invocation of common-law 
charity and its interpretation of public policy in this case, but opined that the majority 
went too far in its description of the IRS’s power to determine what kinds of activities 
served or violated public policy. Id at 606, 611 (Powell concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 166 Id at 579 (brackets omitted), quoting Rev Rul 71-447, 1971-2 Cum Bull 230. 
 167 Bob Jones, 461 US at 586. This interpretation, proposed by the appeals court be-
low, had been formalized by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 71-447. See id at 578–79; Rev 
Rul 71-447, 1971-2 Cum Bull 230. 
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majority found that, by the 1970s, “there [could] no longer be 
any doubt that racial discrimination in education violate[d] 
deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice.”168 This 
approach viewed the common-law notion of public policy as itself 
historically dynamic. The Bob Jones majority did not explain or 
even discuss the situating choices that supported its interpreta-
tion; rather, it treated them as statements of the obvious. 
Alone in dissent, Justice William Rehnquist noted that the 
statute mentioned neither race nor public policy, and that it 
listed educational institutions as a separate category from chari-
table ones.169 The dissent thus rejected the relevance of common-
law terminology along with the contemporaneous policy analysis 
it led to. Instead, Rehnquist would have drawn the bounds of 
relevance more narrowly, at intrastatutory relations among the 
statute’s words. This approach fit textualist prescriptions to fo-
cus on the words of the statute. It also resembled the approach 
of the Sweet Home majority, which saw take as defined not by 
the common law but by the statutory definition. Rehnquist was 
not in the majority in Sweet Home, though. He joined the dis-
sent, agreeing that take should be defined by its common-law 
heritage. That dissent, recall, was written by Scalia, the Court’s 
foremost textualist. 
So it appears that textualism countenances both, on the one 
hand, excluding common-law influences by limiting the bounds 
of relevance to the statute; and, on the other hand, expanding 
the bounds of relevance by letting the common law determine 
the statute’s valence. The differences between the opposing opin-
ions in Bob Jones and Sweet Home hinge on the choice between 
these options. But textualism’s prescriptions allow a judge to go 
either way, even while textualists claim that the theory cabins 
judicial discretion and leads judges to predictable interpretive 
outcomes.170 
Purposivism encourages interpreters to seek signs of con-
gressional goals in a variety of sources and tolerates a more 
pragmatic and variable interpretive process than textualism. 
Unlike textualists, purposivists do not generally make strong 
claims for the predictability and constraints of their approach. 
The eclectic relevance-making practices of the opinions dis-
cussed here, and the fact that a judge could follow a theory’s 
 
 168 Bob Jones, 461 US at 592. 
 169 Id at 613–14 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
 170 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17–18 (cited in note 6). 
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prescriptive tenets to opposite interpretive conclusions, thus 
pose less of a challenge to purposivist claims than to textualist 
ones. Nonetheless, purposivism, like textualism, does not 
acknowledge many of the factors judges draw on to situate texts. 
The wide range and internal differentiation of those factors is 
part of what I illuminate here. While purposivism’s greater pre-
scriptive flexibility may make it more realistic than textualism, 
this lack of recognition leaves it analytically limited. 
Asserting or assuming the relevance of various time periods 
or principles, the opinions in this Section created contexts that 
led quite naturally to their particular interpretations. When two 
opinions reached different conclusions, moreover, it was not be-
cause one situated its text in legal factors while the other looked 
elsewhere. It was because legal factors could support opposing 
conclusions. This suggests that those who hope to constrain 
judges by insisting that they interpret statutory text in light of 
“the corpus juris”171 may ascribe more determinacy to that corpus 
than actual opinions find there. 
Opinions, like commentators, rarely remark on the wide 
range of legal factors they draw on to create contexts for inter-
pretation. They tend to phrase disagreements in terms of inter-
pretive correctness. As this Section’s examples indicate, they 
rarely challenge one another’s claims of relevance directly. This 
lack of direct confrontation—or even recognition—may help in-
terpretive claims pose as statements of fact, rather than as the 
arguments they really are. The next Section shows, moreover, 
that nonlegal sources play an equally important role in situating 
focal text. 
B. How Opinions Situate in Nonlegal Sources 
Statutes usually apply to circumstances outside legal dis-
course itself. Accordingly, even judicial opinions that interpret 
law often situate it within the wider circumstances to which that 
law applies. Though no discussion could be exhaustive, this Sec-
tion aims to highlight the broad range of nonlegal sources that 
opinions use to create contexts for focal texts. Because of the 
breadth of this range, opinions must always make choices about 
what nonlegal factors to draw on. An opinion must thus stake a 
claim—implicit or explicit—that the factors it chooses are the 
ones needed to interpret the statute. And it must argue—again, 
 
 171 Id at 17. 
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implicitly or explicitly—that it describes those factors accurately. 
My discussion emphasizes the way that opinions drawing on non-
legal factors make claims about both relevance and reality. 
1. Relative relevance. 
When the opinions in Chapman v United States172 consid-
ered what constituted “a ‘mixture or substance containing a de-
tectable amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD),’”173 the ma-
jority situated the text in physical facts while the dissent 
invoked sociological ones.174 Pure LSD weighs so little that, to be 
sold, it is “dissolved in a solvent such as alcohol, and [ ] the solu-
tion” is used to impregnate a heavier and more easily divisible 
substance like paper, gelatin, sugar cubes—or something else.175 
This “carrier” is then divided and sold. Petitioners argued that 
the medium on which LSD was sold should be excluded when 
calculating the drug’s weight for the purposes of a statute that 
mandated a five-year minimum sentence for distributing more 
than one gram of a “mixture or substance” containing LSD.176 
The majority opinion, written by Rehnquist for seven justices, 
rejected the petitioners’ argument.177 The opinion related two 
dictionary definitions of mixture to physical facts about LSD. 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary described a mix-
ture as “two or more components . . . that however thoroughly 
commingled are regarded as retaining a separate existence,”178 
while the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) said it comprised 
“two substances blended together so that the particles of one are 
diffused among the particles of another.”179 The majority ex-
plained that once a carrier is impregnated with the LSD-solvent 
 
 172 500 US 453 (1991). Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by White, 
Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Stevens dissented, joined by 
Marshall. Id at 455. 
 173 Id, quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B)(v). 
 174 Chapman affirmed the decision in United States v Marshall, 908 F2d 1312 (7th 
Cir 1990) (en banc); both the majority and dissent in Chapman drew heavily on the opin-
ions in Marshall. 
 175 Chapman, 500 US at 457. 
 176 Id at 457–58. 
 177 Id at 455 (“We hold that it is the weight of the blotter paper containing LSD, 
and not the weight of the pure LSD, which determines eligibility for the minimum 
sentence.”). 
 178 Id at 462, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1449 (Mer-
riam 1986). 
 179 Chapman, 500 US at 462, citing 9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (Clarendon 2d 
ed 1989). 
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solution, the solvent evaporates, leaving “[t]he LSD crystals [ ] 
inside of the” carrier, “commingled with it,” even though “the 
LSD does not chemically combine with” it.180 Conforming to 
Webster’s Third, the drug thus “retains a separate existence”: it 
“can be released by dropping the [carrier] into a liquid or by swal-
lowing” it.181 At the same time, per the OED, “[t]he LSD is dif-
fused among the fibers of the paper”: “[l]ike cutting agents used 
with other drugs” such as heroin and cocaine, the carrier “cannot 
be distinguished” from LSD “nor easily separated from it.”182 
The majority opinion thus asserted, in the same paragraph, 
both that LSD could “be released [from its carrier] by dropping 
the [carrier] into a liquid,” and that LSD “cannot be distin-
guished . . . nor easily separated from” its carrier.183 The dissent 
did not dwell on the puzzle of how both of these physical facts 
could be true. Instead, it situated the statute in another arena of 
nonlegal factors: sociological facts about “how LSD is sold.”184 
The dissent did not have to look far for that information, be-
cause the majority itself stated it: unlike most drugs, “LSD is 
sold by dose, rather than by weight.”185 Indeed, the weight of the 
drug itself is negligible: “an average dose” of pure LSD “weighs 
0.05 milligrams.”186 How much it weighs when it is sold depends 
primarily on the weight of the carrier, not the pure LSD, and 
has no effect on the price. “[W]hether one dose of LSD is added 
to a glass of orange juice or to a pitcher of orange juice, it is still 
only one dose that has been added.”187 Dose and price, moreover, 
are both set by the amount of pure LSD, not the amount of orange 
juice. Thus, while people buying or selling a drug like heroin un-
derstood the dosage to include any cutting or diluting agent, 
people buying or selling LSD understood the dosage to be inde-
pendent of the carrier. 
Drawing on this sociological fact, the dissent argued that 
the majority’s interpretation would result in arbitrary differences 
in sentencing among LSD dealers. “A person who sells five doses 
of LSD on sugar cubes is not [ ] worse [ ] than a manufacturer of 
 
 180 Chapman, 500 US at 462. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Chapman, 500 US at 475 (Stevens dissenting), quoting Marshall, 908 F2d at 
1333 (Posner dissenting). 
 185 Chapman, 500 US at 458 (Rehnquist). 
 186 Id at 457. 
 187 Id at 475 (Stevens dissenting). 
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LSD . . . caught with 19,999 doses in pure form, but [the sugar-
cube seller] is subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum [ ] sen-
tence,” while the manufacturer “is not even subject to the five-
year minimum” because pure LSD is so light.188 It would also 
lead to dramatically longer sentences relative to other drugs: 
one would have to sell “between one and two million doses” of 
heroin to receive the same sentence as someone selling just 
twelve thousand doses of LSD on blotter paper.189 Yet no one had 
presented a reason to punish LSD dealers more severely than 
dealers of other drugs. 
While both Chapman opinions situated the text in nonlegal 
factors, then, one invoked physical facts while the other rested 
on sociological ones. Note that neither claimed that the other’s 
facts were not true or insufficiently documented. The dissent did 
not even mention that the majority’s claims that LSD both 
could, and could not, be easily be separated from its carrier were 
mutually contradictory. Rather, each opinion presented its own 
implicit claims about what factors were relevant to interpreting 
the statute. The majority readily admitted that LSD was sold 
differently than other drugs and that counting the carrier in the 
total weight would produce disparate sentences for different car-
riers. But it did not agree that these facts held the key to inter-
pretation. The relevant factor was instead the physical charac-
teristics of LSD, which led it to become a “mixture” with its 
carrier. For the dissenters, physical facts about how LSD inter-
acted with its carrier did not resolve the ambiguity of the term 
“mixture.” Instead, the dissent viewed sociological facts about 
how dealers and buyers treated the drug as the relevant factors 
within which to situate the text. Although each opinion drew on 
a different sphere of nonlegal facts, in other words, facts were 
not the contested terrain. Relevance was. 
2. Contested realities. 
Opinions can also reach opposing conclusions when drawing 
on similar kinds of nonlegal sources. For instance, the plurality 
and dissent in Rapanos v United States190 each invoked physical 
 
 188 Id at 474 (Stevens dissenting), quoting Marshall, 908 F2d at 1333 (Posner 
dissenting). 
 189 Chapman, 500 US at 475 n 12 (Stevens dissenting), quoting Marshall, 908 F2d 
at 1334 (Posner dissenting). 
 190 547 US 715 (2006). Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito. Roberts also wrote a concurring 
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facts about how materials affect water to interpret a Clean Water 
Act191 provision.192 The Act required landowners to acquire per-
mits before “discharg[ing] [ ] dredged or fill material into [ ] nav-
igable waters.”193 The Army Corps interpreted the statute to re-
quire permits before discharging such materials into wetlands 
adjacent to waters that were themselves navigable, or their 
tributaries.194 Landowners claimed that this interpretation 
stretched the Corps’s jurisdiction too far.195 
The plurality opinion, written by Scalia for four justices, 
situated the text against the background fact that “‘dredged or 
fill material’ . . . does not normally wash downstream.”196 In this 
empirical context, a landowner discharging such material into a 
wetland would not normally be considered to release it into “nav-
igable waters.”197 The dissent, written by Stevens for another 
four justices, also drew on a fact. But it was the opposite of the 
fact that the majority invoked: “fill material,” the dissent ex-
plained, “has the potential to move downstream and degrade the 
quality of [ ] navigable waters.”198 Situated in this different em-
pirical context, the Corps’s interpretation seemed more modest. 
A long line of case law had held the notion of “navigable waters” 
to encompass bodies of water that affected the quality of waters 
that were in fact navigable.199 If fill material in wetlands moved 
and entered navigable waters downstream, it would be reasonable 
 
opinion, and Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens dissented, 
joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion. 
Id at 718. 
 191 Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816, 
codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. 
 192 See generally Rapanos, 547 US 715. For a fuller discussion of the role of facts in 
this case, on which my discussion of Rapanos draws, see Todd S. Aagaard, Factual Prem-
ises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Review Cases, 77 Geo Wash L Rev 366, 368–69, 
372–73 (2009). 
 193 Rapanos, 547 US at 723 (Scalia) (plurality), quoting 33 USC § 1344(a), (d). 
 194 Rapanos, 547 US at 724 (Scalia) (plurality), citing 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(7). The Act 
itself defined “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” Rapanos, 547 US at 
723 (Scalia) (plurality), quoting 33 USC § 1362(7). 
 195 Rapanos, 547 US at 730–31 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 196 Id at 744 (Scalia) (plurality). As Professor Todd Aagaard notes, “The plurality 
distinguished dredged or fill material from ‘traditional water pollutants’ inasmuch as 
dredged or fill material ‘are solids that do not readily wash downstream.’” Aagaard, 77 
Geo Wash L Rev at 369 n 15 (cited in note 192), quoting Rapanos, 547 US at 723 (Scalia) 
(plurality); Rapanos, 547 US at 744 (Scalia) (plurality) (“‘[D]redged or fill material[ ]’ [ ] 
is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put.”). 
 197 Rapanos, 547 US at 723 (Scalia) (plurality), quoting 33 USC § 1344(a), (d). 
 198 Rapanos, 547 US at 807 (Stevens dissenting), quoting United States v Deaton, 
332 F3d 698, 707 (4th Cir 2003). 
 199 See Deaton, 332 F3d at 707 (collecting cases). 
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to conclude that the Act gave the Corps jurisdiction over those 
wetlands. Plurality and dissent thus each asserted its own, op-
posing, truths about the physical world.200 
How did the Rapanos opinions substantiate their incompat-
ible claims about physical facts? The plurality, as Professor Todd 
Aagaard has written, based its factual assertion on “statements 
made in three amicus briefs,” each of which “relied on [the same] 
package of training materials” posted “on a private corporation’s 
web site.”201 These materials, like the plurality opinion itself, did 
not cite any scientific studies on the topic; nor did either give 
any other indication that a scientific community accepted its as-
sertion.202 For its claim about the mobility of fill material, the 
 
 200 Rapanos yielded three other opinions. Kennedy concurred with the judgment of 
the plurality, but was not convinced by its factual assertion. To him, it “seem[ed] plausi-
ble” that fill material “could travel downstream.” Rapanos, 547 US at 774 (Kennedy con-
curring in the judgment). Breyer joined the dissent and also wrote separately to empha-
size the propriety of the Corps’s assertion of jurisdiction based on Congress’s delegation 
of authority, and to encourage the agency to pass a regulation interpreting the term. Id 
at 811–12 (Breyer dissenting). Roberts joined the plurality and also wrote separately to 
castigate the Corps for failing to “develop[ ] some notion of an outer bound to the reach of 
[its] authority” through rulemaking, and for instead “adher[ing] to its essentially bound-
less view of the scope of its power.” Id at 758 (Roberts concurring). 
 201 Aagaard, 77 Geo Wash L Rev at 369–70 (cited in note 192). 
 202 The plurality itself did not cite any empirical analyses. The plurality stated: 
“[A]mici cite multiple empirical analyses . . . including one which concludes that ‘the idea 
that the discharge of dredged or fill material into isolated waters, ephemeral drains or 
non-tidal ditches will pollute navigable waters located any appreciable distance from 
them lacks credibility.’” Rapanos, 547 US at 744 n 11 (Scalia) (plurality) (brackets omit-
ted), quoting Robert J. Pierce, Technical Principles Related to Establishing the Limits of 
Jurisdiction for Section 404 of the Clean Water Act *34–40 (Wetland Science Applications 
Inc, Apr 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/NX5U-3AP9. For the amicus briefs that cited 
this source, see Brief of the International Council of Shopping Centers, National Multi 
Housing Council, National Association of Industrial and Office Properties, Real Estate 
Roundtable, Associated General Contractors of America, American Resort Development 
Association, and National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, Rapanos v United States, Docket Nos 04-1034 and 04-1384, 
*26–27 (US filed Dec 2, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 3294931); Brief of Pulte 
Homes, Inc., Centex Homes, Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., KB Home, Lennar Corpora-
tion and M.D.C. Holdings, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Rapanos v 
United States, Docket Nos 04-1034 and 04-1384, *20–21 (US filed Dec 2, 2005) (available 
on Westlaw at 2005 WL 3308790); Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for Environmental 
and Economic Progress, National Association of Realtors®, Utility Water Act Group, 
and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioners, 
Rapanos v United States, Docket Nos 04-1034 and 04-1384, *29 & n 53 (US filed Dec 2, 
2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 3322931) (“Fill material does not migrate.”). 
The plurality cited this Wetland Science Applications, Inc, document as available on the 
website of the Wetland Training Institute. Rapanos, 547 US at 744 n 11 (Scalia) (plurality) 
(citing the piece as “available at http://www.wetlandtraining.com/tpreljscwa.pdf”). The 
Wetland Training Institute, Inc, is a for-profit entity that describes itself as “an associa-
tion of more than twenty individuals from industry, academia, and government” that 
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dissent relied on an amicus brief and on a lower court opinion 
(which itself did not provide a basis for its assertion).203 Neither 
opinion, in short, “could cite a reliable basis for the [position] it 
expressed as to th[e] facts” about fill material’s mobility.204 
In addition to its factual assertion, the dissent also chal-
lenged the plurality’s implicit claim that the key to interpreting 
the statute lay in determining whether fill material moved 
downstream. Instead, the dissent proposed a wider sphere of 
possibly relevant factors. Because the statute aimed to maintain 
the viability of navigable waters, the really relevant issue was 
not whether fill material moved, but whether it harmed those 
waters. And it could do so even without moving downstream: 
“fill can harm the biological integrity of downstream waters even 
if it largely stays put upstream” by, for instance, creating “ex-
cessive sediment” that interferes with fish reproduction, as 
shown in a published scientific paper about fish reproduction.205 
The plurality, however, responded neither to the dissent’s 
contrary factual assertion nor to its alternative relevance claim. 
In this, Rapanos demonstrates the freedom that opinion writers 
often enjoy when situating legal texts. Even opinions that assert 
opposing facts about the same thing do not necessarily challenge 
one another to substantiate their factual statements. And opin-
ions disagreeing on the proper sphere of relevance do not neces-
sarily push one another to justify their respective purviews. 
 
“was formed . . . to meet the educational and technical resource needs of professionals 
involved in all aspects of water resource conservation, management, and regulation.” 
About Wetland Training Institute (Wetland Training Institute, Inc), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9ALL-K7U9. Its website does not indicate any vetting or review process 
for its material or factual assertions. 
The quoted Wetland Science Applications, Inc, document, similarly, did not cite a 
scientific source for its contention about fill material. Nor does this sole-authored docu-
ment indicate that it received any kind of scientific vetting or peer review. The section 
cited by the plurality, moreover, contains primarily legal analysis. For instance, the sen-
tence quoted by the plurality is followed by this explanation: 
The discharge of fill material as has been classically regulated by the COE, re-
sults in the “discharge” of a “pollutant” that is far different from any other reg-
ulated by the CWA. Congress recognized the difference in the nature of dis-
charges of dredged and fill material when it specifically carved-out Section 404 
and named the Secretary of the Army to administer it. 
Pierce, Technical Principles at *34 (cited in note 202). See also Aagaard, 77 Geo Wash L 
Rev at 369–70 (cited in note 192). 
 203 See Rapanos, 547 US at 807 (Stevens dissenting). 
 204 Aagaard, 77 Geo Wash L Rev at 370 (cited in note 192). 
 205 Rapanos, 547 US at 807 (Stevens dissenting), citing generally Don C. Erman and 
Vernon M. Hawthorne, The Quantitative Importance of an Intermittent Stream in the 
Spawning of Rainbow Trout, 105 Transactions Am Fisheries Society 675 (1976). 
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From Rapanos, it seems that judges have wide latitude both in 
deciding what to find relevant and in how to characterize it. 
Moreover, neither textualism nor purposivism has much to say 
about how judges should, or do, use nonlegal sources. Yet the 
way that opinions situated statutory text in nonlegal context de-
termined the outcomes of the opinions in Chapman and Rapanos. 
3. The relevance and reality of language use. 
Opinions situating focal text also often draw on assertions 
about language. Language, of course, is the opinion’s medium of 
communication. But it can also be a kind of context: opinions of-
ten use assertions about language use, history, and perception to 
situate focal texts. Perhaps most famously, opinions may draw 
on dictionary definitions.206 Some applaud the use of dictionaries 
as an objective guide to meaning, but the Chapman majority’s 
use of somewhat conflicting definitions of “mixture” indicates 
the range of options writers have among entries, publishers, and 
time periods.207 In accordance with their selected texts, for in-
stance, the Sweet Home majority drew on a dictionary roughly 
contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment,208 while the dis-
sent turned to older ones.209 
Opinions also draw on other language facts to situate focal 
text. The Rapanos dissent, for instance, noted that “the very 
 
 206 See Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a 
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 Buff L Rev 227, 248–
60 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of dictionary usage in Supreme Court opinions); 
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies 
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L Rev 1915, 1921–41 (dis-
cussing a number of incorrect assumptions about dictionaries that pervade Supreme 
Court opinions). 
 207 See Chapman, 500 US at 462, quoting Webster’s Third at 1449 (cited in note 178) 
and 9 OED at 921 (cited in note 179). 
 208 Sweet Home, 515 US at 697: 
The dictionary definition of the verb form of “harm” is “to cause hurt or damage 
to: injure.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1034 (1966). . . . 
 . . . [T]he diction ary definition does not include the word “directly” or sug-
gest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury constitutes 
“harm.” 
 209 Id at 717 (Scalia dissenting): 
 To “take,” when applied to wild animals, means to reduce those animals, by 
killing or capturing, to human control. See, e.g., 11 Oxford English Dictionary 
(1933) (“Take . . . To catch, capture (a wild beast, bird, fish, etc.)”); Webster’s 
New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1949) (take de-
fined as “to catch or capture by trapping, snaring, etc., or as prey”). 
(ellipsis in original). 
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existence of words like ‘alluvium’ and ‘silt’ in our language . . . 
suggest[ed] that at least some fill [material] ma[de] its way 
downstream.”210 Scalia’s plurality opinion derided this reasoning 
as “philological,”211 but such inferences from language history 
are common. For instance, in Whitfield v United States,212 the 
Court considered whether a fleeing bank robber who “guided” a 
resident from one room in a house to another had “force[d] [a] 
person to accompany him,” triggering a mandatory minimum 
sentence.213 The defendant argued that the enhanced sentence 
for forced accompaniment applied only to “substantial” move-
ment, not to the few feet he had walked with the resident.214 
Scalia’s unanimous opinion rejected this argument, holding that 
“accompany” simply meant to “go with” someone, irrespective of 
distance.215 
Whitfield situated its focal text within a number of sources, 
including passages from Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and 
Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield.216 Why would novels pub-
lished by speakers of British English in 1813 and 1850, respec-
tively, be authoritative guides to ordinary American English 
usage in 1934, when the statute was enacted? Perhaps Scalia in 
Whitfield took the “philological” approach he had rejected in 
Rapanos,217 deriving the meanings of words in one place and 
time from their appearance in another. The opinion itself does 
not say. Similarly, the opinion quotes a 1995 Supreme Court 
opinion’s use of “accompany,” but does not explain how that 
could indicate what the provision meant to a reader when the 
statute was passed in 1934.218 Perhaps the point was that a 
bank robber could not reasonably claim that he was not on no-
tice of the punishment because the meaning of “accompany” had 
 
 210 Rapanos, 547 US at 807 (Stevens dissenting). 
 211 Id at 744 n 11 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 212 135 S Ct 785 (2015). Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Id at 787. 
 213 Id, quoting 18 USC § 2113(e). 
 214 Whitfield, 135 S Ct at 788, quoting Brief of Appellant, United States v Whitfield, 
Appeal No 10-5217, *50–52 (4th Cir filed July 27, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 
WL 3159889). 
 215 Whitfield, 135 S Ct at 788, citing Oxford English Dictionary 60 (Clarendon 1st 
ed 1933). 
 216 Whitfield, 135 S Ct at 788. 
 217 Rapanos, 547 US at 744 n 11 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 218 Whitfield, 135 S Ct at 788 n 4, quoting Vernonia School District 47J v Acton, 515 
US 646, 650 (1995). See also Whitfield, 135 S Ct at 788 (“Congress enacted the forced-
accompaniment provision in 1934 after an outbreak of bank robberies committed by John 
Dillinger and others.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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become ambiguous through historical change.219 But the opinion 
again does not say. Although it is widely accepted that language 
use differs over time and speech community,220 Whitfield did not 
advert to that possibility. 
Whitfield’s silence about how its sources relate to its focal 
text is unexceptional. Opinions routinely invoke works from eras 
and areas other than those in which the statute was written to 
support claims about ordinary language use.221 But they rarely 
discuss how, and whether, the works they quote support their 
inferences about the text they interpret. Instead, they situate fo-
cal text in contexts whose bearing on interpretation they never 
clarify. 
4. Weighting legal and nonlegal sources. 
Assertions about physical, sociological, and linguistic facts 
often appear alongside legal factors when opinions situate focal 
texts. In Brown & Williamson, for instance, the majority situated 
the statutory command within legal sources postdating the stat-
ute’s enactment; the dissent brought in realities outside the law. 
Brown & Williamson, recall, asked whether the FDA had au-
thority to regulate tobacco products under the statutory grant of 
jurisdiction over “articles . . . intended to affect the . . . body.” 
Neither the majority nor the dissent questioned the FDA’s evi-
dence that tobacco products were intended to affect the body.222 
But the majority did not find this factor relevant to the question 
 
 219 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L Rev 
885, 885 (2004) (“[T]he rule of lenity . . . directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities 
in favor of criminal defendants.”). 
 220 See, for example, J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 
72 Tex L Rev 1771, 1773 (1994) (“At some point, misuse becomes common use, and com-
mon use becomes accepted use.”); William Labov, Principles of Linguistic Change: Cogni-
tive and Cultural Factors 2–5 (Wiley-Blackwell 2010). For an indication that some words 
used by Austen have acquired new meanings over time, see Jane Austen, The Annotated 
Emma 228 n 33 (Anchor 2012) (David M. Shapard, ed) (explaining that the phrase “mak-
ing violent love to her” meant “professing or demonstrating passionate love for her” and 
stating that “‘making love’ had no further meaning then”) (emphasis omitted). 
 221 A good example is Muscarello v United States, 524 US 125 (1998), in which the 
majority cited, among other sources, The King James Bible (translated in Britain be-
tween 1604 and 1611), Robinson Crusoe (originally published in Britain in 1719), and 
Moby-Dick (originally published in America in 1851), to interpret an American statute 
enacted in 1968. Muscarello, 524 US at 129. 
 222 Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 162 (Breyer dissenting) (“[T]he majority no-
where denies [that] . . . tobacco products . . . fall within the scope of th[e] statutory defi-
nition, read literally.”). 
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it posed itself, which was whether Congresses over the twentieth 
century had meant for tobacco to be regulated. 
The dissent, in contrast, contended that the law itself made 
such nonlegal factors decisive. The statute gave the agency ju-
risdiction over “articles . . . intended to affect the . . . body.”223 
Whether a particular Congress meant for some particular thing 
to be regulated was less relevant than whether that thing be-
longed to the category that the enacting Congress had laid out in 
the statute. And that was largely a nonlegal question: particular 
objects could move into or out of the category as the circum-
stances of their production and sale changed. For the dissent, 
the central question was whether something was an article in-
tended to affect the body; answering it required evaluating em-
pirical facts, not congressional pronouncements that postdated 
the statute. 
From Brown & Williamson, one might be tempted to think 
that legal factors generally win out over nonlegal ones. Perhaps 
legal practitioners naturally treat legal sources as more im-
portant, and perhaps there are good doctrinal reasons for doing 
so. Yet nonlegal sources are not just common but often decisive. 
“Supreme Court . . . opinions are chock-full of . . . general state-
ments of fact about the world”224 that not only are “used rhetori-
cally . . . [to] make[ ] [a] position more persuasive,” but also “go 
to the practical consequences of [ ] decisions” and form “a critical 
part of the doctrinal inquiry.”225 Given that judges are generally 
experts in law rather than in any given factual situation to 
which law applies,226 one might expect that the nonlegal factors 
within which they situate their interpretations will involve find-
ings in cases below or administrative proceedings. One might also 
 
 223 21 USC § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 224 Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U Pa L Rev 59, 61 (2013). See also 
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts 
and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex L Rev 269, 273 (1999) (“Judicial opinions are filled 
with assertions about the state of the world.”). 
 225 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 Va L Rev 1255, 
1263 (2012). Scholars like Aagaard, Professor Allison Orr Larsen, and Professor Stuart 
Minor Benjamin have viewed such judicial fact invocation skeptically, arguing for proce-
dures to make the use of research and fact more transparent, predictable, and reliable, 
and to limit the power of judicially asserted facts. See generally Aagaard, 77 Geo Wash L 
Rev 366 (cited in note 192); Larsen, 98 Va L Rev 1255 (cited in note 225); Benjamin, 78 
Tex L Rev 269 (cited in note 224). 
 226 Aagaard finds that “courts often interpret statutes based on factual premises 
that are outside of the judges’ expertise and experience.” Aagaard, 77 Geo Wash L Rev at 
371 (cited in note 192). 
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expect that the practice of invoking empirical realities would be 
constrained by doctrine. Neither is the case.227 Judicial opinions’ 
factual assertions are not recognized by doctrine, and they draw 
on a wide range of sources, including administrative records, lit-
igant briefs, amicus submissions, and independent research by 
justices and clerks.228 
Many, moreover, are not grounded in any clear source but 
are best described as expressions of judges’ beliefs. Opinions 
sometimes present, as though they were uncontestable facts, 
nonlegal factors that are culturally, historically, and even indi-
vidually contingent. For instance, an opinion might assert that 
“[w]hether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful 
moral decision.”229 In fact, “in many countries, abortion is an ac-
cepted part of family planning” that is not treated as a difficult 
moral issue.230 The kind of decision abortion requires is thus an 
empirical question, not a general fact. Similarly, opinions some-
times repeat contested views about social practice as though 
they were facts, such as that “[r]eligious organizations exist to 
foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious 
faith.”231 The purposes that religious organizations serve is a 
complicated question that scholars have debated for centuries, 
and “[f]ew who study religion would agree with [Ginsburg’s] 
statement.”232 Opinions sometimes also base conclusions on logi-
cal inferences from premises that are neither acknowledged nor 
substantiated, such as the claim that market competition among 
privately run prisons “mean[s] . . . that a firm whose guards are 
too aggressive will face damages that raise costs, thereby 
 
 227 See, for example, id at 372–73 (arguing that, because “courts . . . make a mess of 
the factual premises of their statutory interpretation decisions,” agencies should have 
the authority to “revisit factual premises underlying judicial decisions interpreting stat-
utes administered by agencies”); Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1262 (cited in note 225) (“[T]his 
new approach to fact finding is troubling and requires us to rethink our entire process 
for judicial evaluation of legislative facts.”). 
 228 Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1263 (cited in note 225) (showing that “virtually all of the 
Justices” engage in independent fact-finding, creating empirical contexts for their inter-
pretive claims irrespective of “whether they are traditionally labeled liberal or conserva-
tive, and [that] they cite authorities on a wide range of subject matters (from biology to 
history to golf)”). 
 229 Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124, 159 (2007). 
 230 Wen-Shing Tseng and Jon Streltzer, Cultural Competence in Health Care: A 
Guide for Professionals 119 (Springer 2008). 
 231 Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S Ct 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg 
dissenting). 
 232 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (The Immanent 
Frame, July 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5AV7-TXPD. 
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threatening its replacement” by a different firm.233 This inference 
assumes that governments outsource efficiently to the safest and 
most effective private prison firms and that prisoners are able to 
obtain damage awards on a scale that would endanger the eco-
nomic viability of a private prison corporation. But the opinion 
provides no reason to believe that either of these assumptions 
is correct. On the contrary, the Department of Justice under 
President Barack Obama determined that private prisons pro-
vide neither a safe nor an efficient method for incarceration.234 
Finally, sometimes it is the very decision whether to treat 
something as a legal or nonlegal factor that is crucial.235 Words 
 
 233 Richardson v McKnight, 521 US 399, 409 (1997) (“Competitive pressures . . . 
also [mean] that a firm whose guards are too timid will face threats of replacement by 
other firms with records that demonstrate their ability to do both a safer and a more 
effective job.”). 
 234 See generally Sally Q. Yates, Memorandum for the Acting Director, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons: Reducing Our Use of Private Prisons (DOJ, Aug 18, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QDY9-9TZX (laying out a plan to eliminate the Department of Justice’s 
use of privately run prisons on the ground that they are neither cost-effective nor safe). 
Notably, the Department of Justice memo did not suggest that prisoner lawsuits could 
bring private prisons into line; instead, it outlined an administrative plan to cease using 
private prisons. See generally id. As attorney general under President Donald Trump, 
Jefferson B. Sessions recently rescinded this memorandum. See generally Jefferson B. 
Sessions III, Memorandum for the Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons: Rescission 
of Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons (DOJ, Feb 21, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5SAK-94J6. This notice of rescission, however, did not contradict the con-
clusions or analysis of the Yates memorandum; nor did it contain any analysis to suggest 
that private prisons were indeed safe or efficient. It merely stated that the Yates memo-
randum “changed long-standing policy and practice, and impaired the Bureau’s ability to 
meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.” Id at *1. See also Jon D. 
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 725–47 (2010) (arguing that 
the privatization of government functions allows executives to aggrandize powers that 
are otherwise outside their legal prerogative). 
 235 The idea that some terms may be within the specialized meaning-giving domain 
of some expert community is widely accepted in discussions of statutory interpretation. 
See, for example, Ian Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 1–7 
(New York 2006) (discussing the contestation between everyday and purportedly scien-
tific notions of race in Supreme Court immigration cases). See also Anya Bernstein, Dif-
ferentiating Deference, 33 Yale J Reg 1, 22–23 (2016) (discussing the relation between 
terminology based in legal expertise and that based in other kinds of expertise). Favorite 
cases like Nix v Hedden, 149 US 304 (1893)—in which the Supreme Court had to deter-
mine whether a tomato was a fruit or a vegetable for purposes of a customs statute—
illustrate how judges must sometimes choose between everyday and technical meanings. 
See id at 306–07. Nix recognized that tomatoes were botanically classified as fruits, but 
held that they constituted vegetables for the purposes of a tariff statute. The opinion in-
voked American cultural habits, such as broadly accepted times and manners for eating, 
to support its conclusion: 
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, 
squashes, beans and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether 
sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables, which are grown in 
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often lead double lives in the law and outside it. A person de-
scribed as having “actual malice” in an ordinary conversation 
might be presumed to actively harbor ill intent toward another. 
But a publisher being sued for libel can be said to have acted 
with actual malice for much less: merely having a “reckless dis-
regard of whether [a statement] was false” suffices.236 The term 
means something different in everyday speech than in libel 
law.237 And a judge in a libel suit who thought that a publisher 
would be liable only if it actively harbored ill intent toward the 
plaintiff would easily come to different conclusions than one who 
thought that reckless disregard of possible falsity sufficed. 
Whether to situate text in legal terms of art can thus be decisive. 
Yet it can seem strangely awkward for practitioners to ad-
dress this choice straightforwardly. Take, for instance, the re-
cent oral argument in United States v Texas.238 Several states 
challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA),239 which al-
lowed some people not legally authorized to be in the United 
States to request that DHS refrain from removing them and 
grant them work authorization and other benefits.240 Those re-
ceiving such benefits are said to have “lawful presence” within 
the meaning of the benefits-authorizing statutory provisions, 
 
kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are . . . usually 
served at dinner . . . and not, like fruits generally, as dessert. 
Id at 307. In Nix, the Court considered technical usage in the field of botany. What I dis-
cuss here differs slightly: the question is whether a term should be considered as a tech-
nical usage in the field of law. 
 236 New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 237 The disagreement in the Sweet Home opinions can be described along these lines: 
the dissent treated take as a legal term of art that came to the statute predefined, while 
the majority viewed it as a more ordinary sort of word qualified by other ordinary words 
in the statute. Sweet Home, 515 US at 718 (Scalia dissenting) (“[T]ake . . . [is] a term of 
art . . . in the statutory and common law concerning wildlife.”) (quotation marks omit-
ted); id at 697 n 10 (Stevens) (“Congress explicitly defined the operative term ‘take’ in 
the ESA . . . thereby obviating the need for us to probe its meaning.”). 
 238 136 S Ct 2271 (2016) (per curiam). 
 239 See Texas v United States, 787 F3d 733, 743–44 (5th Cir 2015), citing Jeh 
Charles Johnson, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are 
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents *3–4 (Department of Homeland 
Security, Nov 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2A25-778J. 
 240 See 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration (Department of Homeland Security, 
US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Apr 15, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PSX4-54K4; 8 USC § 1611(b)(2) (granting a range of benefits to otherwise-
nonqualified aliens insofar as they are “lawfully present in the United States as deter-
mined by the Attorney General”). 
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but the benefits do not confer a right to remain in the country. 
“Lawful presence” thus resembles “actual malice”: in its particu-
lar area of law, each means something different than it does in 
everyday speech. 
Nonetheless, at oral argument some justices purported not 
to recognize the concept of legal terms of art.241 The govern-
ment’s brief described DAPA beneficiaries as both “lawfully pre-
sent” and “present in violation of the law.”242 “[T]hat must have 
been a hard sentence to write,” said Chief Justice Roberts.243 “I 
mean they’re—they’re lawfully present, and yet, they’re present 
in violation of the law.”244 While the solicitor general replied, 
Roberts repeated with incredulity that jumps off the written 
page: “Lawfully present does not mean you’re legally present in 
the United States. . . . Lawfully present does not mean you’re le-
gally present.”245 Justice Samuel Alito was even clearer on his 
lack of clarity: “I’m just talking about the English language. I 
just don’t understand it.”246 “How can [it] be . . . lawful to work 
here but not lawful to be here?”247 The solicitor general, in turn, 
seemed to find it oddly difficult to remind the justices that ex-
pressions can have technical legal meanings: “It’s—let me just 
go through the reality here, and—and I’ll give you some sense of 
just how disruptive a ruling would be to accept [the plaintiffs’] 
theory on—on who can lawfully work in the United States.”248 
Perhaps part of the difficulty lies in the lack of articulation 
about interpretive practices that characterizes so many of the 
cases discussed here. Opinions are rarely explicit about choosing 
 
 241 Others have noted this troubling exchange. Linda Greenhouse, When Smart 
Supreme Court Justices Play Dumb (NY Times, Apr 28, 2016), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/opinion/when-smart-supreme-court-justices-play-dumb 
.html (visited Mar 27, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable): 
Any lawyer knows that a word that means one thing in ordinary conversation 
can be deployed as a term of art and assume a separate meaning in the context 
of legal analysis. Yet this garden-variety insight seemed to elude Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. during last week’s argu-
ment. . . . It turns out that the phrase “lawful presence” . . . doesn’t have the 
obvious meaning it would have in everyday speech. . . . Is that really so hard 
for two of the top lawyers in the United States to understand? 
 242 Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v Texas, Docket No 15-674, *26–27 
(US Apr 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/VE2J-3ESA (“Texas Transcript”). 
 243 Id at *27. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id at *27–28 (paragraph breaks omitted). 
 246 Texas Transcript at *28 (cited in note 242). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id at *29. 
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to situate texts in legal terms of art, and that very reluctance to 
topicalize the choice may make it difficult to directly confront it. 
As this Part shows, judicial opinions situate focal texts within 
a wide range of sources. This is not to say, of course, that judges 
can situate texts any old way they want. In the lead-up to Bob 
Jones, for instance, the IRS had maintained that it lacked author-
ity to revoke the tax exemption of racially discriminatory schools; 
it changed course when a court seemed poised to enjoin it to do 
so.249 Rehnquist’s dissent tells this story disparagingly.250 The ma-
jority does not mention it at all. Neither considers the impetus of 
litigation for agency policy as legitimately relevant to a court’s 
statutory interpretation.251 Such reluctance indicates the limits 
that the genre places on relevance. But as this Part shows, those 
limits are broad and internally diverse to an extent generally 
not recognized in discussions of statutory interpretation. 
In this Section alone, opinions have situated statutory text 
within the physical world, physiology, psychology, social and 
economic practices, and linguistic patterns. The preceding Sec-
tion, moreover, showed opinions situating texts in legal sources 
that included the statute at issue; historical times before, dur-
ing, and after it; and general principles. This list, though long, 
does not exhaust the range of factors within which judges can 
situate legal texts. Quite likely, no list could. Law is internally 
 
 249 Establishing racially discriminatory private schools was a widespread response 
to the judicial invalidation of segregation in public schools. Olatunde Johnson, The Story 
of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary 
Acquiescence, in Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, eds, Statutory Interpretation Stories 
127, 131 (cited in note 71). 
 250 Bob Jones, 461 US at 619–20 (Rehnquist dissenting): 
Then in the midst of this litigation, and in the face of a preliminary injunction, 
the IRS changed its position and adopted the view of the plaintiffs. 
 . . . [In a subsequent ruling, t]he IRS then concluded that a school that pro-
motes racial discrimination violates public policy and therefore cannot qualify 
as a common-law charity. The circumstances under which this change in inter-
pretation was made suggest that it is entitled to very little deference. 
(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). 
 251 Courts, of course, themselves interpret statutes only under that impetus. While 
judicial interpretations are one-time events motivated by lawsuits, agency interpreta-
tions can be motivated by a wide range of impetuses at different temporal spans, from 
lawsuits to ongoing projects with long-term development. It seems plausible that these 
differences in interpretation’s temporality and motivation might lead to different modali-
ties of interpretation as well. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency 
Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U Toronto L J 497, 519 (2005) 
(proposing a number of factors that may lead administrative agencies to employ ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation that differ from those used or recognized by courts). 
I pursue this possibility in related research on agency statutory interpretation. 
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diverse and touches on all aspects of human life. And judges 
writing opinions can pick situating sources anew in each case, 
claiming relevance for new sources or combining sources in new 
ways. The possibilities for situating focal text are potentially 
endless. 
Strikingly, however, many practices explored in this Part 
remain unnoted by both doctrine and commentary. Opinion au-
thors situate texts within factors that seem relevant and valid to 
them. But they often do not face a call to explain why those, and 
not other, factors are relevant, or to substantiate how they char-
acterize them. This allows opinion writers to present their situ-
ating choices as natural and factual—not as the argumentative 
claims that they really are. 
C. Situating Makes Claims about Relevance and Reality 
The opinions discussed in this Part show how contexts are 
not given in the world but created by legal interpreters. Judges 
draw on a wide and differentiated range of factors to creatively 
produce relevant contexts within which to interpret their chosen 
texts, and to creatively undermine others’ interpretations. This 
process, moreover, is studded with silent claims. 
First, opinions make claims about relevance. By invoking 
some factors and not others, they formulate arguments—often 
implicit ones—about what and who counts. Which speakers, 
writers, or communities should they look to for clues about how 
language works? Which facts about the physical, social, or psy-
chological world should they lean on to make their decisions? 
Which legal eras, concepts, and texts should determine their 
views? In creating context, opinions take the position that the 
factors they present are the ones most relevant to interpreta-
tion, and they reject the relevance of other factors. 
Second, opinions make claims about reality. As they assem-
ble the factors they use into a context, opinions also express po-
sitions—often implicit ones—about those factors’ characteristics. 
How do people, in fact, use a phrase? How does the physical, so-
cial, or psychological world actually work? What position does a 
legal era, concept, or text take? To make them speak to the 
questions at issue, opinions must characterize the factors they 
draw on. 
Situating text, then, involves characterizing background 
factors and claiming that they are relevant to interpretation. 
How, though, do opinions convince readers to accept their 
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claims? How, for instance, does an opinion justify its contention 
that some factors, but not others, are the most relevant to inter-
pretation? The opinions discussed here demonstrate a startlingly 
wide range of approaches. Some lay out the basis on which they 
claim relevance, as when the Green dissent explains that it 
takes the Federal Rules of Evidence’s own stated principles of 
purpose and applicability as guidance for interpreting an indi-
vidual rule. Others simply present evidence without specifying 
how it sheds light on interpretation, as when the unanimous 
Whitfield opinion quotes Austen to show what a word meant in 
1930s America. Relevance claims, then, run the gamut from ex-
plicit and explained to unstated and assumed. 
We can ask the same question about the way opinions char-
acterize the factors they draw on. How does an opinion substan-
tiate its depiction of the factors it assembles? How does it con-
vince readers that its view of the world is accurate? Here we see 
an equally wide range of approaches. Some opinions ground 
their assertions about their chosen factors in voluminous evi-
dentiary records, as when the Brown & Williamson dissent 
draws on the FDA’s scientific findings about tobacco. Others opt 
for thinner evidence, as when the Rapanos plurality substanti-
ates its claim about the physical nature of fill material with an 
unsupported assertion on a corporate website. Still others pro-
vide no evidence at all, as when the Smith dissent lays down its 
rule for interpreting idioms. 
Within this wide range, the cases sampled here—admittedly 
a small set—suggest a pattern worth exploring. These cases 
tend to explain the relevance of the factors they use and sub-
stantiate their characterization of them most carefully when 
they stick closest to the statute at issue. Intrastatutory, contem-
poraneous, and poststatutory factors tend to be carefully justi-
fied and substantiated.252 As these opinions move further out 
from the statutory text, though, they often get less specific.253 
 
 252 For instance, the King majority was at pains to explain the way that the provi-
sion it interpreted interacted with other provisions. King, 135 S Ct at 2489–90. The Green 
majority traced the development of FRE 609 in great detail, while the dissent opted for an 
equally detailed view focused on one particular contemporaneous document. See notes 
140–60 and accompanying text. The majority and dissent in Brown & Williamson and the 
Bob Jones majority discussed in detail a range of legal enactments and policies that post-
dated the statutes at issue and explained how they supported particular interpretations of 
the statutory language. See text accompanying notes 71–87 and 161–69. 
 253 For instance, the Knudson majority invoked principles of equity without specify-
ing which period of equity it looked to. See text accompanying notes 121–26. And the 
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When it comes to substantiating their assertions about nonlegal 
factors, moreover, the opinions surveyed here differ vastly, using 
everything from peer-reviewed findings to personal beliefs. Strik-
ingly, an opinion’s ability to command a majority of votes, or to 
avoid challenge on a particular point, seems not to depend much 
on how it substantiates its claims about the nonlegal factors it 
invokes or how it justifies their relevance to the interpretation. 
If the opinions surveyed here are any indication, it may be 
that the genre of judicial opinion has evolved to require the most 
from judges when they discuss the things that they are best 
versed in—the statute and its surrounding laws—and less when 
they invoke things they are less expert in, like empirical facts. 
That is, the opinions I discuss here suggest that American legal 
culture might credit judicial beliefs about the nonlegal world 
more than judicial statements about the law, even though judges 
will generally be more expert in the law than they are in the 
nonlegal world. To what extent this pattern holds for opinions 
beyond those discussed here deserves further research. I hesi-
tate to make a broad claim about opinions in general based on 
my small set of examples; but it is worth noting that most of the 
cases I discuss are classics of the genre, used in teaching mate-
rials and discussed at length. If not strictly representative, then, 
they are at least important examples. 
A rationalization of this phenomenon might posit that opin-
ions will properly be more careful in discussing factors closer to 
the statutory text because those factors are most authoritative. 
Because legal factors carry greater weight in judicial interpreta-
tion, on this reasoning, judges are right to be more thorough in 
substantiating their factual assertions and justifying their rele-
vance claims. The opinions here, however, contradict this hy-
pothesis: they do not consistently give greater weight to legal, or 
even intrastatutory, factors. The Sweet Home dissent does not 
retreat in the face of the majority’s intrastatutory factors; it in-
sists on the primacy of extrastatutory traditions. The Green ma-
jority and concurrence find extrastatutory principles not tied to 
any source decisive, even while the dissent quotes intrastatutory 
indications of applicability. The Rapanos dissent substantiates its 
factual assertion about fill material’s mobility by quoting a lower 
court finding of fact; the plurality ignores this legally validated 
 
Green majority and concurrence drew on legal principles they described as general with-
out connecting them to any cited source. See notes 140–55 and accompanying text. 
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factual assertion in favor of a different assertion by a source that 
is neither legal nor scientifically validated. Legal factors may be 
entitled to greater weight in principle, but the cases discussed 
here indicate that they do not systematically receive greater 
weight in practice. 
The previous two Sections outlined the kinds of factors that 
judicial opinions tend to draw on when situating focal text. I di-
vided these factors into two broad categories, legal and nonlegal, 
but noted that the borders between them are not fixed or onto-
logical. Rather, opinions sometimes have leeway in characteriz-
ing something as belonging to one or the other category. More-
over, each category is internally differentiated—so highly differ-
entiated, in fact, that we can probably never list all of its possi-
ble parts. This internal diversity emerges from the diversity of 
law and the things it addresses. But it emerges just as much 
from the fact that it is opinion writers themselves who identify 
and delimit the factors they draw on, in the act of drawing on 
them. 
This Section has suggested that, as we analyze how judicial 
opinions situate focal text in legal and nonlegal factors, we can 
productively evaluate them through two related inquiries. We 
can ask how an opinion justifies its claim that certain factors are 
relevant to interpretation, and how it substantiates its depiction 
of those factors’ characteristics. One way such inquiry can be 
productive, I have suggested, is in bringing to light patterns that 
reveal underlying values structuring the genre of the judicial 
opinion. I have pointed out that the opinions I discuss here 
demonstrate a rather counterintuitive pattern: requiring the 
least justification and substantiation in judges’ areas of least 
expertise. 
This suggestion is, of course, impressionistic. But I hope it 
indicates the kind of inquiry that my approach can open up. By 
looking in detail at the kinds of factors opinions invoke to situ-
ate text, and asking how they justify and substantiate their re-
course to those factors, one stands to learn new things about the 
patterns of judicial practice. This in turn allows scholars to look 
further, probing both the conduct of judges and the legal culture 
within which they operate. On the one hand, one can ask what 
values and presuppositions may tilt opinion writers toward 
these practices. On the other, one can ask what these practices 
reveal about the legal culture’s conditions for legitimate legal 
assertion and argumentation. 
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The next Part expands on these benefits. My approach il-
luminates constitutive elements in judicial opinions that are 
analytically prior to the commitments identified by prescriptive 
theories of interpretation. Grounded in widely shared commit-
ments and focused on practices rather than ideological self-
reports, it provides a firm basis for the normative evaluation of 
judicial opinions. And it highlights the creative, interactive, and 
iterative nature of judicial meaning-making. 
IV.  THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF INTERPRETATION: A CONSTITUTIVE 
ANALYSIS 
The preceding Parts illuminate the infrastructure of judicial 
interpretation. Opinions select texts to interpret by parsing stat-
utory phrases, emphasizing some statutory texts over others, or 
looking outside the statute altogether. These are ways of fram-
ing the selected text as focal, relegating everything else to back-
ground. To situate the text they select, opinions weave together 
factors delineated anew in every case. To do that, opinions de-
pict the factors they choose as having certain characteristics, 
and treat those factors as the ones most relevant to interpreta-
tion. Situating brings together some few backgrounded items 
and puts them in a particular light to serve as the immediate 
context within which to view the focal text. Selecting and situat-
ing: this is how judicial opinions constitute what the law is. 
This way of describing things departs from the common 
terminology provided by prescriptive theories of statutory inter-
pretation, especially textualism and purposivism. This Part ex-
plains the benefits of that departure. My approach provides bet-
ter tools for analysis because it illuminates the steps judges 
actually take to make their arguments, rather than focusing on 
the normative commitments judges proclaim. I argue that the 
prescriptive theories are statements of commitment rather than 
methods of analysis. They make appropriate objects of scholarly 
analysis, but should not set its terms.254 
Adopting my more realistic analytic approach, however, 
does not mean abandoning the normative evaluation that often 
characterizes legal scholarship.255 On the contrary, my approach 
 
 254 See Part IV.A. 
 255 See Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rheto-
ric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U Ill L Rev 597, 601 (noting that the “movement between 
normative and reflexive genres . . . is a highly salient aspect of contemporary legal 
thought”). 
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provides a more solid grounding for normative inquiry than the 
prescriptive theories can offer. It allows evaluation to directly 
address core values in American democracy while dynamically 
incorporating different ideas as to what those core values are.256 
Finally, my approach illuminates some of the key things that 
make judicial opinions both efficacious in, and representative of, 
the legal system. It shows the deeply creative, or speech-act, na-
ture of judicial opinions, which help construct the world they in-
habit. It highlights their attempts to stabilize and finalize that 
world by creating a seemingly closed discourse of semiotic final-
ity. And it elucidates how this stability is always illusory, its 
closed discourse permeable, its finalized meanings provisional.257 
A. The Limitations of Prescriptive Theories of Interpretation 
Parts II and III periodically considered how the predomi-
nant theories of statutory interpretation, textualism and pur-
posivism, would analyze my selecting and situating examples. 
Textualism, recall, instructs the interpreter to draw on the focal 
text’s “semantic context,” that is, “evidence about the way a rea-
sonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic 
practices would have used the words,”258 often drawn from dic-
tionaries and judges’ intuitions.259 These rules and norms of 
communication, moreover, are to be viewed against the back-
drop of the rest of the statute and of other legal strictures and 
 
 256 See Part IV.B. 
 257 See Part IV.C. 
 258 Manning, 106 Colum L Rev at 91 (cited in note 6). Professor John Manning goes 
on to describe purposivists as “giv[ing] precedence to policy context—evidence that goes 
to the way a reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment 
would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.” Id. The suggestion that purposiv-
ists strive to discern how a generic reasonable person familiar with the legislative pro-
cess would suppress the mischief is not accurate. Purposivists ask judges to look for clues 
about the way that the particular legislators enacting the statute expected, or wanted, it 
to work. Manning’s phrasing draws a parallel between textualism and purposivism at 
one of the few points at which they diverge: in textualism’s preference for general contex-
tualizations versus purposivism’s preference for specific contextualizations. See Solan, 
38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2028 (cited in note 6) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles be-
tween [the textualist and purposivist] camps . . . is the fact that both sides . . . agree upon 
almost everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”). Because Manning is a 
prominent proponent of textualism, I take his presentation of textualism as fairly au-
thoritative, even though I question the accuracy of his accompanying characterization of 
purposivism. 
 259 Solan, 38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2053 (cited in note 6). 
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traditions—the “corpus juris.”260 The idea is that because only 
words actually enacted into law give a legal command, interpre-
tation should stay within the bounds of the language the statute 
uses. One common justification is that this approach best en-
forces the “deals” or compromises that legislators inevitably 
make when passing a law.261 
Purposivists look to the statute’s language and legal sur-
round as well,262 but also look for clues about how the legislature 
that enacted the statute expected it to work, and what goals it 
meant the statute to achieve.263 Legislative history such as 
“committee reports, conference committee reports, and the joint 
statements of conferees who drafted the final bill” can provide 
those clues.264 The idea is that Congress passes a law for a rea-
son, and judges should heed the ways Congress “makes its pur-
poses known.”265 On this view, affording Congress lawmaking 
primacy means taking Congress’s cue and “using the interpretive 
 
 260 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 6). On textualism, see 
Solan, 38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2029–30 (cited in note 6) (explaining that, for evidence 
about the meanings of unclear terms, textualists eschew pronouncements by those who 
wrote and voted on the terms and consider instead what those terms mean to idiomatic 
speakers of American English); Manning, 106 Colum L Rev at 91 (cited in note 6) (argu-
ing that textualists should look to a term’s “semantic context”) (emphasis omitted). 
 261 For this view, see, for example, Manning, 116 Harv L Rev at 2390 (cited in note 87): 
[T]he precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded compromises 
among interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit leg-
islative decision to forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision. . . . 
Textualists [ ] believe that the only safe course for a faithful agent is to enforce 
the clear terms of the statutes that have emerged from that process. 
 262 I use the term “purposivism” to encompass both purposivism and intentionalism. 
Both are generally opposed to textualism insofar as they attempt to discern the will of 
the enacting legislature, and they are often used together or interchangeably. See 
Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 22 (cited in note 6) (describing intentionalism as “purpose 
analysis”). 
 263 Katzmann, Judging Statutes at 31–35 (cited in note 6). See also generally Heydon’s 
Case, 76 Eng Rep 637 (Ex 1584). Given its emphasis, it may make sense to describe pur-
posivism as a search for legislators’ understanding of statutory meaning as much as, or 
even more than, their purposes in enacting the statute. A group of legislators may, for 
instance, have diverse reasons for voting for a statute and desires about what it should 
accomplish, yet share a roughly similar understanding of what the words mean and how 
the statute will work. 
 264 Katzmann, Judging Statutes at 19 (cited in note 6). For an explanation of what 
legislative history is and how it is produced, see Nourse, 122 Yale L J at 92–97 (cited in 
note 65). 
 265 Katzmann, Judging Statutes at 4 (cited in note 6). See also Mikva, 1987 Duke L J 
at 386 (cited in note 65) (“If judges are to make congressional primacy meaningful, they 
cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools which members of Congress use to explain 
what they are doing and to describe the meaning of the words used in the statute.”). 
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materials the legislative branch thinks important to under-
standing its work,” including legislative history.266 
Both of these approaches ask judges to be “faithful agents” 
of the Congress that passed a statute.267 But they disagree about 
what constitutes a valid indication of the meaning of a statutory 
term: Is it a statute’s words in their linguistic and legal context, 
or is it that plus the legislative situation in which the statute 
was enacted? That disagreement, in fact, may be the linchpin 
distinguishing the two theories, which otherwise have so much 
in common.268 In other words, it is the theories’ differing atti-
tudes about how judges should situate focal text that differenti-
ates them from one another.269 One might expect, then, that each 
theory would have an elaborated approach to situating. 
In fact, these theories treat the linchpin notion of context 
rather simplistically. They acknowledge—sometimes grudgingly—
that contextualization plays a role in statutory interpretation.270 
But they conceive of context in large, internally undifferentiated 
chunks: statutory text, legal background, linguistic usage, legis-
lative history.271 As my examples demonstrate, actually existing 
opinions do not confine themselves to these few, discrete, prede-
termined realms. First, opinions situating text in these contexts 
tend to parse the world more finely, carving out areas within 
each category to juxtapose: a preceding legal background versus 
a contemporaneous one, my linguistic usage against yours. Sec-
ond, opinions routinely ignore the boundaries of these catego-
ries, invoking with abandon things like empirical facts and de-
velopments that postdate the statute—kinds of context that 
 
 266 Katzmann, Judging Statutes at 29 (cited in note 6). 
 267 Paul W. Kahn and Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Statutes and Democratic Self-
Authorship, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 115, 118–20 (2014) (explaining the faithful agent 
model and arguing that it is wrong). 
 268 See Fallon, 99 Cornell L Rev at 687 (cited in note 6) (noting that textualism and 
purposivism both acknowledge the relevance of context to statutory interpretation); 
Solan, 38 Loyola LA L Rev at 2028 (cited in note 6). 
 269 Some legal theorists have taken a different tack, arguing that statutory interpre-
tation should take a more present-oriented approach. See, for example, Aleinikoff, 87 
Mich L Rev at 49–61 (cited in note 6); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 
107–11 (cited in note 6); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L Rev 1, 
4–5 (1996). These approaches tend to have a broader and more realistic view of how 
judges use context to interpret statutes. 
 270 See Fallon, 99 Cornell L Rev at 687 (cited in note 6). 
 271 Legislative history presents a partial exception to the theories’ oversimplification 
of context. There has been some discussion—leading to some consensus—about what 
kinds of legislative history exist and which are more reliable indicators of congressional 
purposes. See generally, for example, Nourse, 122 Yale L J 70 (cited in note 65). 
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neither theory acknowledges. The prominent theories’ descrip-
tions of how judges situate text are thus both underspecified and 
underinclusive. 
Additionally, these theories purport to predetermine the al-
lowable contexts within which opinions may situate statutory 
terms. Indeed, their main dispute is about which of their context 
categories judges ought to invoke. But, as I showed in Part III, 
actual opinions do not use prefab contexts. They situate text in 
particular contexts that they create for particular cases by mak-
ing claims about particular factors. The factors they invoke, 
moreover, are not predictable: judges can carve out aspects of 
the law and the world in new and different ways, or put together 
preexisting factors to create a new context. When it comes to 
situating text, these theories offer narrow, blunt, and static op-
tions, while judges choose broad, nuanced, and dynamic ones. 
When it comes to selecting text, the theories offer even less. 
Neither recognizes that judges select the text they interpret. 
Further, as Part II showed, these theories often do not give 
judges a reason to select one text over another. Both a purposiv-
ist and a textualist could side with Justice Scalia in Sweet 
Home, selecting take because it was the operative legal term and 
thus expressed congressional purpose. Both a purposivist and a 
textualist could also join Justice Stevens to select harm, because 
it was the operative qualifier and expressed what Congress 
wanted take to mean. The same goes for King: established by the 
State could be taken as the operative qualifier that expressed 
what Congress wanted Exchange to mean; or Exchange . . . under 
section 1311 could be construed as the operative legal term that 
expressed congressional purpose.272 Often, the theories do not 
motivate selecting one text over another.273 
These theories and the commitments they express thus en-
ter the picture only after the crucial decision has already been 
made. Say one thinks of textualism as a method for enforcing 
the legislative deals expressed in statutory language.274 A judge 
striving to achieve that goal in Sweet Home still must decide 
what text in the statute expresses the relevant deal. Is it take or 
 
 272 See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King–Obamacare Subsidies as Tex-
tualism’s Big Test (SCOTUSblog, Nov 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/44Y7-FKR9. 
 273 The failure to recognize selecting and the oversimplification of situating may be 
one reason that others have found that neither of these theories “can systematically pro-
duce determinate results in the ‘hard cases.’” Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 
322 (cited in note 7). 
 274 See Manning, 116 Harv L Rev at 2390 (cited in note 87). 
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harm? How would she know where the relevant deal lies? The 
interpretation of the statute hinges on that choice, but textual-
ism gives a judge no principled way to make it. Perhaps a textu-
alist judge selects the text intuitively, out of a general feeling or 
understanding about what the statute means and what legisla-
tive deals it embodies. But if so, she acts to fulfill textualist 
commitments by violating textualist tenets, because textualism 
does not countenance interpretation based in general feelings or 
understandings rather than in text. In other words, textualist 
commitments might rationalize how a judge approaches the text 
she has selected. But they do not rationalize selecting one text 
as opposed to another. 
Purposivism may be more able to recognize and motivate 
text selection. A purposivist in Sweet Home would look for the 
purpose of statutory text—but which text should it be? Selecting 
take might suggest a different purpose than selecting harm 
would. A judge might, in keeping with purposivist tenets, con-
sider general statutory purposes and other clues to help decide 
which text to select. Purposivism’s greater flexibility and toler-
ance for overall assessment would allow it to more easily incor-
porate the fact that judges select text, and it can also help ra-
tionalize particular selections. At the same time, purposivism, 
like textualism, does not account for the fact that opinions select 
text, and therefore provides no way to analyze selection. 
From a certain perspective, this inability to analyze the in-
frastructure of interpretation may not be that much of a failure 
after all. It makes sense once we consider the function these 
theories serve. Textualism and purposivism declare what the 
underlying goals of interpretation should be and prescribe how 
people should go about fulfilling them. But, as life experience 
suggests, telling people what they ought to do is not the same as 
explaining what people, in fact, do. As prescriptive theories, tex-
tualism and purposivism present philosophical commitments, 
not analytical methods. Their stances on how people ought to 
behave are grounded in overarching convictions about what con-
stitutes political legitimacy and how political processes should 
work. In this sense, these theories are classically ideological 
products. 
By ideology, I mean rationalizations or explanations through 
which people cohere their worldviews, guide their practices, and 
align themselves with others: those “more or less coherent pat-
terns of meaning which are felt to be so commonsensical that 
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they are no longer questioned, thus feeding into taken-for-
granted interpretations of activities and events.”275 These sys-
tematized expressions of worldviews relate social practice with 
social structure in ways that explicate, but also systematically 
obscure, important aspects of the world to adherents.276 Such ex-
planations are an integral part of social life: this is how people 
make sense of the world and their place in it. 
At the same time, ideology works primarily to cohere, justify, 
and judge, not to analyze or explain. So one should not be too 
surprised when textualism and purposivism fail to acknowledge 
or explicate crucial aspects of statutory interpretation. These 
theories express self-understandings through which members of 
the American legal community describe, distinguish, and vali-
date themselves. As ideological statements, these theories 
should be objects of scholarly analysis. But this does not mean 
that they should provide the categories of scholarly analysis. On 
the contrary, it suggests the opposite: “It is a social science 
commonplace that the ways the natives talk about behavior 
must be recognized as different from the analysts’ accounts of 
how and why they act the way they do.”277 And indeed, they turn 
out to be a poor source for categories of analysis, insofar as they 
do not explain—or in some cases even recognize—actual inter-
pretive practices. 
Despite their explicitly prescriptive, ideological character, 
these theories of statutory interpretation are sometimes treated 
as though they were tools for analysis, rather than for normative 
evaluation. As I have shown, this mistake allows the infrastruc-
ture of interpretation to go unrecognized. It also allows prescrip-
tion to sneak into the limelight of scholarly inquiry. Much statu-
tory interpretation scholarship, for instance, focuses on these 
prescriptive theories. Scholars debate which prescriptive ap-
proach is better; gloss their intricacies and implications; critique 
them; or offer alternative, better, prescriptions. But all of this 
 
 275 Jef Verschueren, Notes on the Role of Metapragmatic Awareness in Language 
Use, 10 Pragmatics 439, 450 (2000) (describing what “are usually called ideologies”). 
 276 See Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and Com-
parison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 L & Society Rev 687, 706 (1988) (arguing 
that ideologies “reveal the terms in which a society organizes its own contests over the 
universe of its imagined alternatives”). This use should not be confused with the nar-
rower, and more negative, use of “ideology” in much legal scholarship, in which it tends 
to mean something more akin to political party membership or position on specific politi-
cal issues. 
 277 Michelle Z. Rosaldo, The Things We Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and 
Speech Act Theory in Philosophy, 11 Language Society 203, 227 (1982). 
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tells us more about prescriptive theories than about judicial 
practices. 
Allowing the analysis of interpretation to be hemmed in by 
the terms of prescriptive theories, in other words, may make 
scholars less attentive to what opinion writers do. And what 
opinion writers do turns out to be much more complex and crea-
tive than the prescriptive theories allow for. The analytic pur-
chase that selecting and situating give for explaining the argu-
mentative structure of opinions thus warrants departing from 
the rubric offered by textualism and purposivism. 
B. Selecting and Situating as a Basis for Normative Evaluation 
Focusing on how judges select and situate text, moreover, 
does not mean abandoning normative judgment. On the contrary, 
taking selecting and situating into account could provide firm 
and flexible bases for the normative evaluations of how opinions 
should fulfill their reason-giving obligations; what role different 
factors ought to play in interpretation; and what overarching vi-
sions of the law opinions ought to further. It can also help schol-
ars evaluate the strength and consistency of the prescriptive 
theories themselves. 
This may seem surprising, because my approach does not 
involve any normative strictures. Rather than starting from 
premises about what judges ought to do, I have started from 
what judges actually do to build up to their interpretive conclu-
sions.278 Unlike the prescriptive theories, my aim has not been to 
evaluate which focal text is the “correct” one or which contextu-
alizing factor is “really” relevant.279 As Parts II and III showed, 
opinions produce texts and contexts as social effects. Determin-
ing the correct text or real relevance that precedes an opinion’s 
treatment is therefore often not possible. There is no objectively 
correct option that exists outside those creative practices. 
I have also eschewed asking whether opinion writers honestly 
represent their inner convictions or reveal their true motivations—
 
 278 Of course, much more goes into interpretation than judicial opinions. Parties’ 
briefs, behind the scenes exchanges among judges, and the research, writing, and con-
versations of judicial clerks are primary sites for selecting and situating text. Judges’ 
educational, political, and personal backgrounds and beliefs play a vital role as well. This 
Article looks at just the public product of this complex process—the opinion itself. 
 279 See Riles, 1994 U Ill L Rev at 601 (cited in note 255) (lauding an anthropological 
perspective on law, which situates legal reasoning “as one particular cultural reality” to 
make “apparent and explicit” a “movement between normative and reflexive genres” that 
characterizes “contemporary legal thought”). 
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for instance, whether their interpretations are simply masks for 
their policy preferences. Selecting and situating structure how 
inner states such as convictions and motivations are publicly 
expressed and legitimated to their audiences. In this sense, I 
have taken a social, rather than individual, view of opinions, tak-
ing them as artifacts that reveal something about their society as 
much as about individual authors. The conventions and the cre-
ativity of selecting and situating illuminate what counts as valid 
legal argument in American legal culture, and show how legal 
actors claim legitimacy while both harnessing and modifying its 
parameters. 
Having no normative views built into the analytical struc-
ture, however, does not preclude normative evaluations. On the 
contrary, it provides a flexible basis for nuanced and grounded 
normative judgment. Perhaps more importantly, it opens the 
door for discussions and debates about a wide range of norma-
tive considerations—not just those that the prescriptive theories 
of statutory interpretation choose to foreground. 
First, my approach allows us to evaluate how, and how well, 
opinions justify their interpretive conclusions. In the American 
tradition, reason-giving is one of the judiciary’s fundamental ob-
ligations. A legitimate opinion does not merely hand down a fiat; 
it should reach its conclusions through rational considerations 
that it articulates so that its audiences can utilize, evaluate, and 
contest them.280 Because selecting and situating focal text are 
the building blocks of statutory interpretation, rationalizing 
those choices is crucial to giving reasons for an opinion’s inter-
pretive conclusions. 
I have suggested that we can productively evaluate this as-
pect of reason-giving by asking two related questions. One, how 
does an opinion justify its claim that the factors it invokes are 
the most relevant to interpretation? Two, how does it substanti-
ate its characterization of those factors? Justifying claims of rel-
evance and substantiating claims about reality are central to an 
opinion’s rational articulation of its interpretation. Yet doctrine 
and theory impose no constraints on these practices. And my ex-
amples show that opinions vary wildly on this score. If anything, 
I suggest, the opinions surveyed here display a rather counterin-
tuitive tendency to justify and substantiate the most in areas in 
which judges have the most expertise, such as statutes, and the 
 
 280 See Cohen, 96 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie at 2 (cited in note 105). 
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least in areas in which judges are least expert, such as empirical 
facts about the nonlegal world. 
The uneven, and possibly perverse, way that opinions sup-
port claims about relevance and reality calls out for normative 
evaluation. Is it rational, or desirable, to have judges create con-
texts using empirical claims for which they provide no basis? Or 
to treat as authoritative assertions about language use whose 
relation to the speakers they purport to describe is never ex-
plained? In a judicial system oriented around reason-giving, the 
answers seem self-evidently negative. Yet reading the cases dis-
cussed here, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that American le-
gal culture at times tolerates, and may even encourage, such un-
reasonable reasoning. 
One can evaluate text selection in a similar way. Opinions, 
as I have shown, have considerable latitude in choosing what 
they will interpret, and the prescriptive theories have little to 
say about it. Judges can thus easily choose not to explain why 
they select the text they do, leaving one central step of interpre-
tation out of their reason-giving altogether. 
Evaluating how opinions justify and substantiate their select-
ing and situating choices thus provides a solid foundation for 
normative judgments about how well opinions fulfill their reason-
giving obligations. Some may claim that judges select and situ-
ate on the basis of their adherence to one or another prescriptive 
theory of interpretation. Yet, as my discussions here have 
shown, the theories often offer little guidance about selecting 
and situating. That leaves judges on their own in the leap from 
normative orientation to efficacious interpretation. It seems only 
reasonable to ask how these—or other—normative commitments 
lead judges to select and situate text as they do. It seems even 
more reasonable to ask judges to explain that process them-
selves. Such evaluation is all the more important, moreover, be-
cause judges will inevitably lack expertise in many of the 
sources on which they draw for interpretation. Independently 
substantiating every characterization of every factor opinions 
draw on could well bring adjudication to a standstill.281 To allow 
the public to evaluate the strength of their reasoning, then, 
judges should be maximally clear about the reasons behind their 
 
 281 This is, perhaps, why procedures for arriving at adjudicative facts are so much 
more elaborated than those for arriving at legislative facts. 
BERNSTEIN_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017  11:22 AM 
2017] Before Interpretation 639 
 
selecting and situating choices. My approach allows readers to 
evaluate how well judges fulfill this reason-giving obligation. 
Second, by sketching a provisional map of the ways opinions 
select and situate text, my approach allows commentators to 
evaluate the relative weight opinions give to different kinds of 
authority. Does an opinion stick close to the statute or range fur-
ther afield? Does it hinge on legal sources or the nonlegal world? 
Some commentators may subscribe to a hierarchy of sources. For 
instance, they may believe that considerations closest to the 
statute should carry the greatest weight and that legal consid-
erations should have greater authority than nonlegal ones.282 By 
focusing attention on the range of factors opinions employ, my ap-
proach provides a way to assess the extent to which opinions ad-
here to any such hierarchy of sources in statutory interpretation. 
Third, while I do not attempt to probe judges’ inner states, 
my analysis facilitates evaluating the attitudes that their opin-
ions suggest or comport with. For instance, the majority opinion 
in Green invoked equality between civil litigants as an underly-
ing principle guiding the law. The concurring opinion invoked 
the special treatment of criminal defendants as such an underly-
ing principle. Should we accept either proposition? Which one? 
And why? These opinions invoke these principles as presumable 
background considerations. But the very fact that one opinion 
invokes one principle while the other invokes another suggests 
that the legal system may benefit from a clearer elucidation of 
the role these commitments should play. 
Similarly, the majority and dissent’s different selections in 
Sweet Home comport with different understandings of the role of 
regulatory statutes. If one sees environmental regulation as a 
break with traditional property law, it makes sense to treat a 
statute as providing its own definition for a legal term: harm. If, 
on the other hand, one sees regulatory rights and obligations as 
constrained by older, private law legal norms, it makes sense to 
treat the statute as incorporating, not replacing, common-law 
property concepts: take. I do not claim that this is what Stevens 
 
 282 Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s well-known “funnel of abstrac-
tion” suggests this hierarchy, though it does not address nonlegal sources. Eskridge and 
Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 353–54 (cited in note 7) (arguing that sources closer to the 
statutory text tend to carry more interpretive weight than sources further from it: an 
“interpreter will value more highly a good argument based on the statutory text than a 
conflicting and equally strong argument based upon the statutory purpose” because the 
purpose is higher up on the scale of abstraction, that is, more removed from the most 
concrete level, statutory text). 
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or Scalia thought when writing their opinions; I do not have ac-
cess to their inner states. But something more important than 
inner state is at play here. These different text selections pre-
sent readers with competing conceptions of the proper role of dif-
ferent kinds of law. Recognizing this allows others to identify, 
and weigh in on, an important normative debate—one that cen-
ters not on whether take or harm is the proper object of interpre-
tation, but on the proper relationship between administrative 
and common law.283 Bringing such values to the surface, my ap-
proach encourages scholars and judges to engage in debate about 
the underlying values that these opinions express or further. 
Moreover, the range of positions we can inquire into in this 
way is flexible. It is circumscribed by the concerns not of textual-
ism or purposivism, but of those doing the evaluating.284 I don’t 
stake a normative position, in other words; but I provide tools 
for nuanced and dynamic normative assessments. 
Finally, my approach can provide a basis on which to evalu-
ate prescriptive theories themselves. Each theory rests on an 
image of legislation and a normative position about how judges 
ought to relate to it. We can debate each theory’s external 
claims, such as whether its image of legislation is accurate.285 
But we can also ask about its internal coherence: How well do 
each theory’s aspirations fit its prescriptions? Textualists, I have 
suggested, can enforce only the legislative deals they find in text 
they have selected. But textualism gives little guidance as to 
how to select the text that best expresses the legislative deal, or 
to determine which text expresses the most important legisla-
tive deal. While it gives some instructions for situating text, it 
drastically underspecifies the variety of legal sources judges must 
choose from, gives judges no way to evaluate their own assertions 
 
 283 In this sense, my position here echoes Professor Levinson’s argument that consti-
tutional adjudication suffers from too much emphasis on finding common-law analogues 
to public law situations and too little discussion of its underlying substantive values. 
Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1375–76 (cited in note 8). 
 284 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 322 (cited in note 7) (“[A]lthough 
each [prescriptive] theory rests upon and subserves important values that should be con-
sidered when interpreting statutes, no theory persuades us that its cluster of underlying 
values is so important as to exclude all others.”). The normative grounding I provide here 
allows scholars to construct—and make a case for—alternative clusters of underlying 
values. 
 285 See generally, for example, Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us 
about the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 Fordham L Rev 607 (2014) (explaining that 
neither textualism nor purposivism presents a realistic understanding of how federal 
legislation is produced). 
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about language, and does not recognize the importance, and 
availability, of nonlegal sources. Purposivism may bring its aspi-
rations closer to its prescriptions, allowing judges to use the 
statute and legislative history as a guide to selecting the text 
that fits best with the overall purposes they find there and to 
situating it in the factors closest to those goals. Yet purposivism 
also falls short of recognizing these practices or instructing 
judges to justify and substantiate claims about relevance and 
reality. 
My point is not to give a full-fledged evaluation of these 
theories. Rather, I hope to show that whatever their interpretive 
commitments, they will be carried out through selecting and sit-
uating text. So assessing how well a theory’s commitments com-
port with the guidance it gives on selecting and situating text 
should provide a useful way of evaluating the theory. Similarly, 
relating what interpreters do to what theories tell them to do 
gives us more indication of the theory’s power than does asking 
whether a judge claims adherence to it. 
C. Judicial Opinions as Efficacious and Unpredictable 
Utterances 
I have argued that the concepts I sketch out here—selecting 
and situating, justifying and substantiating—give us tools for 
analyzing judicial opinions that should at least supplement, and 
possibly replace, those provided by the prescriptive theories of 
interpretation. I have also suggested that my approach can pro-
vide a more grounded, nuanced, and flexible basis for the nor-
mative evaluation of opinions. In this Section, I argue that my 
approach also sheds light on another critical feature of judicial 
opinions: their effects in the world, and the way those are tied 
up with how they present their reasoning. 
Judicial opinions—it hardly needs saying—are an important 
locus of legal action in American society. Most obviously, hold-
ings directly affect the world around them: they determine legal 
rights and obligations and then mobilize state power to effectu-
ate them. In this sense, judicial holdings are classic performa-
tive utterances, or speech acts. Performatives are statements 
that create the state of affairs they describe.286 When I promise 
 
 286 Michael Silverstein, Cultural Prerequisites to Grammatical Analysis, in Muriel 
Saville-Troike, ed, Linguistics and Anthropology 139, 144 (Georgetown 1977) (describing 
speech acts as utterances that “create those ‘facts’” necessary to understanding the ut-
terances “in the very context in which they are uttered, by convention”). The term 
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to buy milk, I do not just describe a situation. I create one. I cre-
ate my obligation to buy milk, or, perhaps more accurately, I 
create a new world, a world in which I have obligated myself to 
buying milk. Similarly, when a judge pronounces a couple mar-
ried, she creates a world in which the couple is, in fact, married. 
As Professor Marianne Constable has recently written, 
speech acts permeate the law.287 Oaths, contracts, objections—
these are all efficacious ways of uttering.288 A court holding that 
trading a gun for drugs is using a firearm in a drug trafficking 
crime makes it so. An opinion asserting that a case is “about” 
something constitutes that thing as the case’s subject. Opinions 
exert this constitutive power even when drawing on facts about 
the nonlegal world. First, they create relations of relevance: a 
Brown & Williamson opinion invoking tobacco’s effect on the 
body establishes tobacco’s effect on the body as significant. Sec-
ond, they constitute nonlegal factors as facts for the purposes of 
the opinion—even if not for the purposes of real life. When a 
Rapanos opinion asserts that fill material does not wash down-
stream, it creates a world in which that is so for legal purposes, 
irrespective of how such material behaves in the physical 
world.289 Or, at least, it attempts to do so. If Justice Anthony 
Kennedy had joined either side in Rapanos, that side would 
have successfully created its world as a matter of legal, if not of 
physical, fact.290 
That is the power of the performative: even when it fails as 
accurate representation, it may create its own truth for the pur-
poses of its social situation. My promise to buy milk may fail as 
a description of truth. I may forget to buy milk. I may secretly 
have had no intention of buying milk. But by promising, I created 
a somewhat separate, no less powerful, truth: the truth of hav-
ing obligated myself. Similarly, an opinion may fail to represent 
the physical truth about fill material and yet, at the same time, 
create a truth for its particular, legal, situation. 
 
“performative utterance,” drawn from Professor J.L. Austin’s classic 1955 lectures, is 
often used interchangeably with “speech act,” drawn from Professor John Searle’s Speech 
Acts. See Austin, How to Do Things with Words at 4–7 (cited in note 9); Searle, Speech 
Acts at 16–19 (cited in note 9). 
 287 Marianne Constable, Our Word Is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts 21 (Stanford 
Law 2014) (arguing that legal speech pervasively “depend[s] for [its] success as law not 
only on the meaning of words but also on the circumstances in which they are” conveyed). 
 288 Id at 1–16. 
 289 See Rapanos, 547 US at 744 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 290 See Constable, Our Word at 23 (cited in note 287). 
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But it can do so only if others accept its act as legitimate. 
Speech acts have their effects only when uttered under appro-
priate “felicity conditions.”291 A judge who pronounced passing 
strangers married would not have a world-changing effect: not 
being uttered under felicitous conditions, those words would lack 
the speech act’s efficacious power. The felicity conditions under 
which we consider an utterance efficacious can also reveal 
shared values and understandings, that is, cultural convic-
tions.292 Knowing the felicity conditions for a marriage pro-
nouncement, for instance, can deepen our understanding of how 
a culture constructs the ability to enter into associations and the 
authority to change others’ legal status. 
Speech acts, moreover, are just one particularly visible in-
stantiation of the creative function of language use, in contrast 
to its presupposing function.293 The creative function helps affect, 
create, or show in a new light the state of affairs in which the 
utterance appears. “We,” for instance, is often the sort of term 
through which “speakers in speaking create a social group 
around them, including some members of [society] and excluding 
others.”294 That is, while the term “we” refers to a group, saying 
it can also help constitute a dispersed bunch of people as a 
group. Like a speech act but more subtly, that kind of creative 
 
 291 See Austin, How to Do Things with Words at 14 (cited in note 9) (explaining that, 
for a speech act to be successful, “[t]here must exist an accepted conventional procedure 
having a certain conventional effect”). 
 292 See Rosaldo, 11 Language Society at 228–29 (cited in note 277): 
Searle uses English performative verbs as guides to something like a universal 
law. I think his efforts might better be understood as an ethnography—
however partial—of [ ] views of human personhood and action as these are 
linked to culturally particular modes of speaking. . . . 
 . . . [U]nderstanding of linguistic action always, and necessarily, demands 
much more than an account of what it is that individuals intend to say: . . . the 
“force” of acts of speech depends on things participants expect; and . . . such 
expectations are themselves the products of particular forms of sociocultural 
being. 
 293 See, for example, Silverstein, Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural De-
scription at 33–34 (cited in note 9) (distinguishing between utterances in which an “as-
pect of the speech situation [is] presupposed by the sign token,” such that one cannot un-
derstand a word without some shared knowledge about its situation of use, and a 
creative usage, which “make[s] explicit and overt the parameters of structure of the on-
going [context]” and brings some aspect “into sharp cognitive relief”); Silverstein, Cul-
tural Prerequisites at 142 (cited in note 286) (noting that the “entities” referred to by per-
sonal pronouns such as “I,” which designate “speech-event roles, are not ‘out there’ in 
any sense; they are created by speech itself ”). 
 294 Bernard Weissbourd and Elizabeth Mertz, Rule-Centrism versus Legal Creativity: 
The Skewing of Legal Ideology through Language, 19 L & Society Rev 623, 626 (1985). 
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utterance can have an effect in the world by helping to create 
the situation it refers to.295 As this discussion suggests, creative 
utterances also depend on felicity conditions of sorts. Saying 
“we” would not constitute any old bunch of people as a group; 
they must be somehow amenable to being groupified. While 
these sorts of conditions may be difficult to define abstractly, 
they are no less revealing of underlying cultural convictions and 
conventions.296 
Judicial opinions are replete with creative expression, often 
masked as presupposing. Selecting text and situating it appear 
to rely on existing, independently verifiable, obviously relevant 
factors, but in fact are creatures and claims of opinion writers. 
Through this creativity, opinions can spread ideas about law, so-
ciety, and justice that go beyond the outcome of any given case. 
This is one reason I focus as much on dissents as on majority 
opinions here. Both instantiate accepted practices of legal argu-
mentation, and both can nudge those practices in new directions. 
 
 295 In contrast, saying “that chair is green” does not help constitute the chair. As a 
presupposing utterance, it builds on things that are already recognized: “[T]he chair exists 
apart from the utterance.” Id. See also Silverstein, Cultural Prerequisites at 142 (cited in 
note 286) (“Presupposition is [ ] a relationship [ ] between signal token and context: some 
proposition must be establishable as true on grounds independent of the signal token 
itself in order for the signal token to have some specifiable functional effect.”). Presuppo-
sition and creativity are best understood not as distinct types of utterances but as func-
tions that utterances can serve in communication. See Silverstein, Cultural Prerequisites 
at 142 (cited in note 286) (noting that these functions run along a “scale” from more to 
less). Legal writing often “fail[s] to do justice to the creativity of speech, concentrating 
instead on presupposed . . . elements of the speech situation.” Weissbourd and Mertz, 19 
L & Society Rev at 627 (cited in note 294). So do many everyday understandings of how 
language works. Research indicates that speakers, in general, are more sensitive to and 
articulate about the presupposing aspects of language use (the referents that exist inde-
pendently of the communication) than its creative ones (the things that communication 
creates or highlights in a new way). See Michael Silverstein, The Limits of Awareness, in 
Alessandro Duranti, ed, Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader 382, 382 (Blackwell 2001). 
The creative power of speech often falls outside “[t]he [l]imits of [a]wareness.” Id. 
 296 For example, linguists and anthropologists have shown how choices between dif-
ferent forms of address—for example, the French tu and vous—can both signal and affect 
social relations in subtle ways. See, for example, Roger Brown and Albert Gilman, The 
Pronouns of Power and Solidarity, in Thomas A. Sebeok, ed, Style in Language 253, 257–
59 (MIT 1960) (showing that across European languages, tu forms tend to be used for 
subordinates and among equals who are in “solidarity,” while vous forms tend to be used 
for the more powerful and the less solidary); Paul Friedrich, Social Context and Seman-
tic Feature: The Russian Pronominal Usage, in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds, 
Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication 270, 287–95 (Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston 1972) (discussing how choices in pronouns can contribute to “dy-
namic relations” among speakers, in part by “express[ing] idiosyncratic impulses or the 
peculiarities of a situation”). 
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The creative power of legal utterances can thus both consol-
idate and change relations of authority and conditions of legiti-
macy—sometimes at the same time. For a famous example, 
think of the words from the Declaration of Independence, “We 
hold.” Who is that “we,” and how can it commit itself to holding? 
That statement, Professor Hannah Arendt theorized, “consti-
tutes a free coming together” of a community that it also “em-
powers.”297 Moreover, in the same moment that it conjures the 
community, it issues “a promise and a declaration” of “a shared 
agreement [for] . . . the community’s subsequent being together,” 
that is, a shared agreement about the ongoing parameters of le-
gitimated political action in that community.298 This beginning is 
Arendt’s exemplary instantiation of “a singularly human capacity: 
that of world-building,” whose “source of power . . . is the speech 
act itself.”299 
For Arendt, this kind of creativity—grounded in the creative 
community rather than in religious or traditional authority, and 
expressed through original language rather than through rou-
tine or force—is the very definition of the political action appro-
priate to a democracy.300 And while Arendt discusses a particu-
larly famous phrase, the efficacious quality of language she 
discusses—its world-building power—characterizes creative ut-
terances more generally. We see this power with selecting and 
situating, utterances that do not call attention to their world-
building capacity but nonetheless help constitute the world they 
refer to. 
This constituting power of action through language, how-
ever, is also inherently unpredictable. Utterances live on as oth-
ers take them up, argue with them, redeploy them, or reinter-
pret them over time.301 We see this quite overtly in judicial 
opinions, for which the accrual of commentary and reason-giving 
provides a rich resource. Dictum can make its way into doctrine, 
 
 297 B. Honig, Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of 
Founding a Republic, 85 Am Polit Sci Rev 97, 101 (1991), citing Hannah Arendt, On 
Revolution 175 (Viking 1963). 
 298 Honig, 85 Am Polit Sci Rev at 101 (cited in note 297). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 198 (Chicago 1958). See also id at 25 
(naming this kind of efficacious yet contingent action and speech as the two categories of 
human activity “out of which rises the realm of human affairs”). 
 301 Id at 237. Arendt sees truly political action as both irreversible and unstable: ac-
tion has real effects whose meanings and implications exceed our control. Our only “re-
demption” from these terrifying characteristics are, on the one hand, the capacity of 
“promising,” and, on the other, the “faculty of forgiving.” Id. 
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making law out of offhand remarks.302 Concurrences can come to 
overshadow their majorities.303 Dissents can foreshadow—or 
provide—arguments that appear in later majorities.304 Supreme 
Court opinions affect the reasoning of lower courts, but lower 
courts also take them up in their own ways. And judicial state-
ments can have broader cultural influence, presenting or cement-
ing ways of seeing the world beyond legal doctrine. The opinions I 
discuss here demonstrate this unpredictability in their contesta-
tion about the proper focus and sources for legal action.305 This 
lack of closure—the dynamic way that participants in a polity 
continually wrangle their way toward a never-completed “shared 
agreement [for] . . . the community’s [ ] being together”306—is, for 
Arendt and others, the essence of democracy.307 
Yet, even as judicial opinions engage in their creative, ago-
nistic, and unpredictable work of meaning-making, they present 
this action as something else: presupposing, uncontroversial, 
 
 302 For instance, the notion that courts should consider “special factors” in Bivens 
actions, which are now central to the constitutional tort inquiry, began with offhand dic-
tum. Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: 
What Is Special about Special Factors, 45 Ind L Rev 719, 731 (2012). 
 303 For instance, “Justice Jackson’s concurrence” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v 
Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952), “has emerged as the Court’s controlling paradigm for con-
fronting [ ] separation of powers issues.” Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown Sheet to 
Boumediene: A Story of Judicial Ethos and the (Un)Fastidious Use of Language, 115 W 
Va L Rev 577, 578 (2012). 
 304 For example, Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), argued 
that the majority’s invalidation of statutes prohibiting same-sex sexual activity would 
logically imply invalidating statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage; the Court went on 
to do just that. Compare id at 604–05 (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that the Lawrence ma-
jority “opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a dis-
tinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as . . . mar-
riage is concerned”), with Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2597 (2015) (holding that 
constitutionally guaranteed “liberties extend to . . . intimate choices” such as marriage). 
 305 The American pragmatists similarly thought that meaning-production had a dy-
namic quality of ongoing reinterpretation and contestation. Charles Sanders Peirce fa-
mously described communication as involving a sign “which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity.” Charles Sanders Peirce, Logic as Semiotic: The 
Theory of Signs, in Justus Buchler, ed, Philosophical Writings of Peirce 98, 99 (Dover 
1955). The sign stands for its object. Its interpretant represents the relationship between 
sign and object. But the interpretant is itself a sign, a “translation, explanation, or concep-
tualization of the sign/object relation in a subsequent sign representing the same object.” 
Richard J. Parmentier, Peirce Divested for Non-intimates, 7 Recherches Sémiotiques [Se-
miotic Inquiry] 19, 20 (1987). The inherently social cycle of semiosis thus continues in-
definitely, each “‘interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum’ . . . so 
that semiosis can only be ‘interrupted’ but never ended.” Barton Beebe, The Semiotic 
Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L Rev 621, 638 (2004). 
 306 Honig, 85 Am Polit Sci Rev at 101 (cited in note 297). 
 307 Arendt, The Human Condition at 144 (cited in note 300) (“Action, though it may 
have a definite beginning, never . . . has a predictable end.”). 
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obvious. They try to fix meanings even as they unsettle them. 
This process, I suggest, is one way that “the mundane details of 
the legal process . . . are arranged to produce the effect that the 
law exists as a formal framework, superimposed above social 
practice,” and obscure the fact that legal processes like inter-
pretation are themselves “social practices.”308 The way that 
opinions hide their creativity bolsters this illusion that law is 
ontologically distinct from the society it governs. And it allows 
opinions to talk as though their legal interpretations were not 
subject to ongoing reinterpretation and contestation—as though 
they could be final or determinate. The genre of judicial opinion, 
then, seems to push participants to ignore the inherent instabil-
ity and contestability of legal meaning. 
Some have suggested that when courts deny the availability 
of alternative meanings, claiming that “a statute is plain and 
therefore needs no interpretation,” they do so through subter-
fuge or delusion: “They have already interpreted, and they then 
declare that so interpreted the statute needs no further inter-
pretation.”309 From a psychological perspective, judges may in-
deed find some texts sufficiently clear not to require interpreta-
tion. Professor Richard Fallon, for instance, has posited that 
judges are pushed to interpret by an “interpretive dissonance” in 
which they sense a disjuncture between the “first-blush mean-
ing” of statutory words and what one would expect from a “rea-
sonable legislature” writing “well-written legislation.”310 On this 
view, that creative, agonistic, and unpredictable meaning-
making takes place only at the margins. And indeed, ordinary 
interactions suggest that communication does not always re-
quire creativity and agonism. Sometimes a stop sign is just a 
stop sign. 
Yet, at the same time, intuitions—about first-blush mean-
ings, about well-written legislation, and about stop signs—are 
structured by cultural characteristics and individual experi-
 
 308 Timothy Mitchell, Society, Economy, and the State Effect, in George Steinmetz, 
ed, State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn 76, 90 (Cornell 1999). Professor 
Timothy Mitchell calls on scholars to illuminate how distinctions between seemingly on-
tological categories like “state” and “society” are produced. Id at 76–77. Disciplinary and 
discursive practices, such as regimes of time, space, and bodily control—and, I would 
add, genre, framing, and argumentation—are among “those modern techniques that 
make the state appear to be a separate entity that somehow stands outside society.” Id 
at 85. 
 309 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863, 869 (1930). 
 310 Fallon, 99 Cornell L Rev at 688–89 (cited in note 6). 
BERNSTEIN_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017  11:22 AM 
648  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:567 
   
ences.311 Whether a term is obvious or ambiguous, then, depends 
to some extent on the questions people pose about it. Agonism, 
creativity, and unpredictability do not have to accompany every 
assertion of meaning; but they are always potentially available. 
This is especially so given the premises of the adversarial litiga-
tion system, which allows parties to subject statutory meanings 
to interpretive arguments. Ambiguity, in other words, is not 
something that inheres in a term or an utterance so much as 
something that is created through social processes. One key 
place in which legal ambiguity is created is in the lawsuit, in 
which each adversary presses its own interpretation. One can 
say that, in an adversarial system, it is precisely arguing about 
things that makes them arguable. 
The cases I have discussed here show hints of this. The 
meaning of the Affordable Care Act’s tax credit provision was 
widely seen as obvious—until it became an issue of heated de-
bate in King. What “accompany” means might seem obvious 
once it is defined by a unanimous Supreme Court, but the fact 
that certiorari was granted on the question in Whitfield under-
mines that easy dismissal. To say that an utterance is obvious, 
intuitive, understood, or not in need of interpretation, in other 
words, involves an assertion about social realities that are sub-
ject to change. Whether we feel dissonance may depend on our 
communicative intuitions, but those intuitions are in turn influ-
enced by the arguments that others make about the text. 
Perhaps one reason not to acknowledge this is the worry 
that admitting that some interpretive question has no single, de-
finitive answer would delegitimate judicial power. In American 
legal theory, after all, the claim that meaning is indeterminate 
has been seen to “undermine[ ] the legitimacy of [any given] le-
gal interpretation.”312 This poses a deep problem for a discipline 
that has long—or at least periodically—recognized that “[a] 
statute . . . is essentially ambiguous”313 because “words which 
are applicable to things . . . always have many meanings.”314 
 
 311 As Professor Thomas S. Kuhn famously suggested in the realm of science, there 
is no truly pretheoretical understanding: “[P]aradigms give form to the scientific life.” 
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 109 (Chicago 4th ed 2012). 
 312 Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law 113 (Princeton 
2000) (noting that this claim is frequently made by “legal hermeneutic scholars”). 
 313 Radin, 43 Harv L Rev at 868 (cited in note 309). 
 314 Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 Vand L Rev 407, 419 
(1950) (arguing that interpreters are never limited to any “one meaning, . . . neither the 
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In contrast, I have suggested here that it is through this 
very indeterminacy that people create—that is, claim, contest, 
and set conditions for—the legitimacy of legal texts.315 Legitima-
tion is always a socially constituted process. In law, it is carried 
out through linguistic expression and interpretation. A constitu-
tive analysis of legal interpretation reveals how people deal with 
tensions and uncertainties in their cultural norms and struc-
tures of authority—whether that means changing, illuminating, 
or burying them out of sight. How opinions communicate these 
choices is not a separate issue in this process; it is a central par-
ticipant.316 As Constable writes, “Language is not like a window 
through which we look to an outside of which we are not part. 
Our speech is akin rather to the paths we walk as we make our 
way through the wider world.”317 Rather than undermining a ju-
dicial opinion’s legitimacy, the indeterminacy of meaning is the 
condition for its legitimation. 
Recognizing the creativity through which judicial opinions 
interpret the law, moreover, helps us understand the standards 
for legitimate action that the legal community imposes. We see 
through legal discourse’s implicit claims to closure to the dynamic 
production of an interpretation structured by sometimes surpris-
ing social norms. The approach I present here, in other words, 
can teach us not just about judicial interpretation but also about 
ourselves. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the text a judicial opinion interprets is 
not given but selected, and that the context within which the 
opinion situates this text is not predetermined but created by 
 
meaning which [the] author intended, nor the meaning which a reasonable person would 
ascribe to [the words], nor the meaning which either party expected of the other”). 
 315 In this I echo Charles P. Curtis’s valorization of multivalence: “[W]ords which are 
applicable to things . . . always have many meanings. Their author, I say, expects them 
to, wants them to, indeed uses, and even comes to admire, this above all their other vir-
tues.” Id. 
 316 Professors Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, for instance, have expressed im-
patience with commentary that “ma[kes] ‘language’ and ‘meaning’ into philosophical 
pseudo-problems,” allowing scholars to avoid confronting the “specific . . . sources of inco-
herence in [ ] American” law, such as the distance between America’s “history of racial hi-
erarchy and exclusion” and its “textual promise of racial equality.” Binder and Weisberg, 
Literary Criticisms of Law at 22 (cited in note 312). My analysis suggests that just how 
judicial opinions constitute the relation between social structure and “textual promise” 
remains relevant to the analysis of both. 
 317 Constable, Our Word at 15 (cited in note 287). 
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the opinion itself. As with so much communicative labor, these 
practices also reflect back on their practitioners. As judges select 
and situate, they also claim legitimacy for their approaches and 
set the parameters for legitimate legal utterances over time. 
This recognition provides new tools with which to analyze how 
opinions achieve effects and attract adherents. It provides a firm 
basis for a flexible range of normative evaluations. And it shows 
how opinion-writing practices themselves participate, in some-
times hidden ways, in the arguments about what matters and 
who counts that characterize democratic politics. 
These insights are especially helpful given the grip that pre-
scriptive theories of statutory interpretation hold on scholarly 
analysis. Those theories fail to recognize text selection, and mis-
takenly treat context as a guided choice within a limited and 
static buffet of predetermined frames. In contrast, I show that 
selecting the object of interpretation is a crucial constituent in 
legal interpretation, and demonstrate that judges create con-
texts by combining diverse and unpredictable factors in unique 
ways. Just as importantly, I explain why these theories make 
their mistakes: their prescriptive orientation is ill-suited to 
analysis. Such normative tenets should not be mistaken for ei-
ther representations or explanations of how judges actually act 
through their writing. 
Recognizing the constitutive nature of selecting and situat-
ing thus opens up a range of inquiries about legal interpretation 
and the theories that purport to guide it. It allows one to evalu-
ate how opinions comport to a range of normative ideals and 
commitments.318 It allows one to survey how different opinions 
build their arguments without depending on practitioners’ self-
reports about interpretive commitments, and without being 
boxed in by the narrow range of normative concerns identified 
by prescriptive theories. In the same way, my approach provides 
a basis on which to compare sets of opinions. Say, for instance, 
one wants to know whether interpretive approaches have 
changed over time or differ among courts. Instead of trying to 
shoehorn opinions into the broad, predetermined commitments 
of the prescriptive theories, my approach gives a commentator 
tools with which to track subtle differences and similarities 
across opinions by looking for patterns in the way they select 
and situate text. It thus provides a nuanced, detailed way to 
 
 318 See Part IV.B. 
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pursue a comparative inquiry free of normative preconceptions. 
Similarly, if one wants to assess whether judges or courts have 
been consistent in their statutory interpretation, one can track 
their selecting and situating practices, rather than their claims 
of adherence to a particular approach. 
As an example of the kind of patterning one might unearth, 
I noted above that the opinions discussed here tend to provide 
the least rationalization when they roam furthest from the stat-
utory text.319 Whether this tendency in fact characterizes opin-
ions in general, or opinions at any particular time, deserves fur-
ther study. If the trend holds, it may indicate one way that 
statutory interpretation has not quite caught up to the adminis-
trative state. While legislation now encompasses a vast world of 
complex empirical facts studied by a host of expert disciplines, 
statutory interpretation may still treat the facts that law ad-
dresses as relatively simple, available in an unmediated way to 
“judicial experience and common sense.”320 In other words, as-
sessing patterns and contrasts in selecting and situating can 
help us understand how statutory interpretation has developed 
and how it relates to its contemporary legal surround. It may 
also spur further inquiry into judicial competence, to evaluate 
whether judges would benefit from training or outside assis-
tance when dealing with particular substantive areas.321 One 
could also consider whether doctrine ought to recognize the need 
to rationalize selecting and situating choices, perhaps even pre-
scribing such explanations. 
This Article has focused on Supreme Court statutory inter-
pretation opinions, but the approach here suggests many other 
places to look and questions to ask. One can look elsewhere in 
the judicial system. Do lower courts select and situate in the 
same way, or do they display different patterns and practices? 
One can hypothesize that, having a different place in the judicial 
hierarchy, lower courts might make their choices differently as 
well. Do specific areas of statutory interpretation—tax law, say, 
or employment—tend toward particular patterns of selection 
and situation? It is possible that opinions in a particular area of 
law serve not only as legal precedents but also as models of se-
lection and situation for later opinions. 
 
 319 See Part III.C. 
 320 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 679 (2009). 
 321 See Bernstein, 33 Yale J Reg at 34–35 (cited in note 235). 
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Using my approach, one can also look beyond the judiciary. 
The other primary interpreters of statutes are administrative 
agencies.322 How do agency administrators select and situate 
text? Because of their particular institutional characteristics, 
they may well select and situate differently from judges.323 One 
can also look to the producers of statutes. How do those who 
draft legislation understand the selection and situation choices 
of those who interpret it, and how do they incorporate those 
choices into their drafting?324 
Furthermore, one can extend my approach beyond the stat-
utory realm. Do these moves also capture the key moments of 
constitutional adjudication? Because they are closely connected 
to interpretive practices in other areas of communication, I sus-
pect that selecting and situating will be key aspects of any legal 
interpretation. But I also suspect that the way they manifest 
may differ over subject areas, institutions, and types of law. All 
these suspicions, of course, are empirical questions that call for 
further investigation of legal texts. 
Questions remain about my approach as well. I have de-
scribed selecting and situating as co-constitutive conceptual 
moments: each depends on the other, and there is no hard line 
separating the two. It is not entirely clear, though, whether one 
is more important to interpretation than the other. From one 
perspective, once a judge has selected a text, she has effectively 
chosen the context within which to situate it. From another, it is 
the choice of context that leads a judge to a particular text. Is 
one move primary, or are they equal? Are they sequential, or 
simultaneous? The precise parameters and relationships at play 
remain to be explored. 
 
 322 See Strauss, 66 Chi Kent L Rev at 321 (cited in note 1); Mashaw, 55 U Toronto L 
J at 502–03 (cited in note 251). 
 323 See, for example, Mashaw, 55 U Toronto L J at 519 (cited in note 251) (explain-
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At a more abstract level, this Article also implies a position 
on analytic methods. In asking readers to focus on the micro-
practices of interpretation, I have asked them to reproduce those 
practices here. That is, I have asked readers to select particular 
judicial practices and interpretive moments as objects of analy-
sis, and to situate them within the opinions that use them and 
the theories that address them. Selecting and situating, I have 
suggested, largely determine how a judicial interpretation will 
go. In a similar way, choosing a method may largely determine 
how an analysis will go. Opinions present judicial interpretation 
as a closed discourse of obvious choices. In a similar way, I pre-
sent my approach as a better way to explain that discourse: 
both a way to show that it is neither closed nor obvious, and a 
way to understand how opinions present it as being so. In the 
end, I hope that this Article has fulfilled its own burden of giv-
ing reasons to treat selection and situation as central to statu-
tory interpretation. 
